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本文通过检验2005年前后高管薪酬—业绩之间敏感性的变化,考察了2005年我国上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的增强是否能够提高薪酬契约的有效性。检验结果表明,对于垄断行业的国有企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年前后没有发生变化;对于竞争行业的国有企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年之后有所下降,尤其是处于地区市场化进程比较低的国有企业;而对于竞争行业的民营企业,其高管薪酬—业绩之间的敏感性在2005年之后有所增强,尤其是处于地区市场化进程比较高的民营企业。以上研究结果表明,上市公司高管薪酬信息披露的增强,并不必然导致薪酬契约有效性的提高,对于不同类型的公司,其影响是不一样的,主要取决于上市公司所面临的人才竞争状况与公司治理水平。本文不仅丰富和拓展了国内外关于信息披露与高管薪酬之间关系的研究,而且对于我国监管部门增强高管薪酬信息披露的监管实践具有一定的指导意义。
In this paper, by examining the changes in the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance before and after 2005, this paper examines whether the enhancement of the disclosure of senior executives’ remuneration information in China’s listed companies in 2005 can improve the effectiveness of the compensation contract. The test results show that for the state-owned enterprises monopoly industries, the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance did not change before and after 2005. The sensitivity between executive compensation and performance for state-owned enterprises in competitive industries was in 2005 Year after the decline, especially in state-owned enterprises with relatively low marketization in the region; while the sensitivity between executive compensation and performance of private-owned enterprises in competitive industries increased after 2005, especially in the region Market-oriented process of relatively high private enterprises. The above results show that the disclosure of executive compensation information of listed companies does not necessarily lead to the improvement of the effectiveness of the pay contract. For different types of companies, the impact is not the same, mainly depending on the competitive situation of the listed companies And corporate governance level. This article not only enriches and expands the research on the relationship between information disclosure and executive compensation both at home and abroad, but also has certain guiding significance for the supervisory departments in our country to enhance the supervisory practice of information disclosure of executive compensation.