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虽然已有研究表明控股股东对公司会计信息质量具有重要影响,但很少深入分析控股股东在获取共享收益时如何影响公司会计信息质量,也没有考察控股股东实施影响的特定渠道。文章考察控股股东委派董事这一特定渠道在实现控股股东共享收益目标时,对于公司盈余管理行为的监督是否表现出非对称性。文章使用中国资本市场上市公司2004-2011年的数据进行检验,研究结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事发挥了有效的监督作用,显著降低了高管的盈余管理行为;但当公司高管向下操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事并没有发挥监督作用。使用工具变量控制内生性问题与分组测试的结果表明结果具有稳健性。进一步测试控股股东委派董事与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系,结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事并没有加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性;只有当公司高管向下操纵盈余时,控股股东委派董事才会加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性。文章结论对于理解公司董事会构成和治理功能的发挥具有现实意义。
Although some studies have shown that the controlling shareholder has an important influence on the quality of the company’s accounting information, it seldom analyzes in depth how the controlling shareholder can affect the quality of the company’s accounting information when obtaining the shared income, nor does it examine the specific channels through which the controlling shareholder exerts influence. This article investigates whether the supervision of the company’s earnings management behavior shows asymmetry when the controlling shareholder appoints the director as a special channel to achieve the goal of controlling shareholder’s share of earnings. The article uses the data of China’s capital markets listed companies from 2004 to 2011 to test, the results show that when the company executives to manipulate earnings upward, the controlling shareholder of the appointment of directors has played an effective monitoring role, significantly reducing the earnings management behavior of executives; When senior executives plunged down their earnings, the controlling shareholder’s assignment of directors did not play a supervisory role. The use of instrumental variables to control endogeneity and the results of the grouping tests showed robustness of the results. The further test of the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s appointing directors and the sensitivity of executive compensation shows that the controlling shareholder’s assignment of directors does not enhance the performance sensitivity of executive compensation when senior executives manage to surrender. Only when executives of the company move downward Control of earnings, the controlling shareholder of the appointment of directors will enhance the sensitivity of executive pay performance. The conclusion of the article is of practical significance for understanding the composition of the board of directors and the function of governance.