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中小企业在我国国民经济的发展中起到重要作用,然而由于信息不对称引起的逆向选择和道德风险都使中小企业面临融资难的问题。本文通过构建博弈模型阐述了银企博弈出现的穷徒困境,并在引入担保机制的后,用新的博弈模型阐述引入担保机制的作用及其发挥作用的条件。本文博弈模型的结论通过了江苏省三家商业银行的数据检验,说明中小企业信用担保机制的引入能够增加市场的信用水平。
Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in the development of national economy in our country. However, the adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information all make SMEs face financing difficulties. This paper elaborates the dilemma of the players in the game between banks and enterprises through the construction of a game model. After the introduction of the guarantee mechanism, the new game theory is used to explain the role of the guarantee mechanism and its conditions. The conclusion of the game model in this paper has passed the data test of three commercial banks in Jiangsu Province, which shows that the introduction of SME credit guarantee mechanism can increase the market credit level.