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《废弃电器电子产品处理基金征收使用管理办法》规定电器电子产品生产者应当履行基金缴纳义务,对处理企业给予定额补贴,通过构建政府和两个生产企业、一个垄断的处理企业组成的stackelberg博弈模型,得出政府社会福利最大时基金征收和补贴标准及其对利益相关者的影响。研究发现:(1)政府征收的基金受生产企业之间竞争程度的影响,在完全竞争时,社会福利最大时政府征收的基金等于企业给环境带来的负的外部性,社会福利最大时政府补贴高于不能回收处理的WEEE给环境带来的负的外部性;(2)政府征收基金会造成产品销售价格上升,销售量下降,消费者效用下降,生产企业将部分收费转嫁给消费者;(3)政府对处理企业补贴会使得处理企业愿意向消费者回购废弃电器电子产品时支付更高的价格,回购数量增加,消费者效用增加。
The Measures for the Administration of the Collection and Use of Waste Electrical and Electronic Product Processing Funds stipulates that the producers of electrical and electronic products shall fulfill their fund payment obligations and grant fixed subsidies to the handling enterprises through the construction of a stackelberg game model consisting of a government and two manufacturing enterprises and a monopoly processing enterprise , Draw the government social welfare fund collection and subsidy standards and its impact on stakeholders. The findings are as follows: (1) The fund levied by the government is affected by the degree of competition among the manufacturing enterprises. At the time of complete competition, the fund levied by the government at the time of maximum social welfare is equal to the negative externality brought by the enterprise to the environment. When the social welfare is greatest, the government Subsidies are higher than the negative externalities caused by WEEE, which can not be recycled; (2) Government levied funds will cause the sales price of products to rise, the sales volume to drop, the consumers’ utility to drop, and the manufacturing enterprises will pass some of the charges to the consumers; (3) The government subsidies for enterprises will make the disposal enterprises willing to pay higher prices when consumers buy back the waste electrical and electronic products, the repo quantity will increase and the utility of consumers will increase.