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Abstract： How to reinterpret Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation in metaphysical terms in the face of the dilemma of the “end of metaphysics” has become a problem that contemporary researchers cannot avoid facing. Recognizing Heaven as a personal god or an embodiment of principle cannot answer the questions raised by analytic philosophy and deconstruction. As a consequence， Confucian moral metaphysics has no way to gain its rightful legitimacy. Huang Kejian’s metaphysics of value understands Confucius and Mencius’s concept of Heaven as an ethereal spiritual plane of virtue， and thereby to some extent solves the dilemma of the “end of metaphysics.” Furthermore， the metaphysics of value aspires to the fulfillment of highest excellence， which can correct the bias in Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation. Not only does this make their views more distinctive， but it also helps them to regain metaphysical significance and obtain a new and timely lease of life.
Keywords： Confucius， Mencius， Heaven–human relation， metaphysics of value
The Heaven–human relation is one of the most significant questions of pre-Qin Chinese philosophy， and the one upon which Confucius and Mencius shed the deepest light. Metaphysics was once an important early modern approach to its interpretation. However， since the twentieth century， the dilemma of the “end of metaphysics” forces us to rethink this approach. Devoted to reconstructing metaphysics， Huang Kejian 黃克剑 creatively proposes the idea of a “metaphysics of value.” This paper attempts to review Huang’s interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the metaphysics of value， hoping to provide something helpful to the field.
Modern Interpretations of Confucius and Mencius’s
Concept of Heaven [Refer to page 25 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
It is generally held that the concepts of Heaven and humanity changed dramatically during the Shang （1600–1046 BCE） and Zhou （1046–256 BCE） dynasties. Modern scholars’ understanding of Confucius and Mencius’s concept of Heaven and human are mainly based on this consensus. Nevertheless， their specific interpretations are highly diverse， because the starting points of their theories differ from one another.
Feng Youlan 冯友兰 （1895–1990） said there were five meanings of “Heaven” （tian 天） in Chinese texts. Specifically， there was the material Heaven （the Heaven often spoken of in opposition to Earth）， the ruling Heaven （the anthropomorphic Heaven）， the fatalistic Heaven （applied to all those events in human life over which man himself has no control）， the naturalistic Heaven （equivalent to the English term Nature）， and the moral Heaven （the highest principle of the cosmos）. Feng concluded that Heaven in the Analects always referred to the ruling/presiding Heaven. Consciously， Feng made subtle distinctions between the meanings of Heaven. Undoubtedly this was a commendable endeavor. Nevertheless， if one examines the text of the Analects in detail， one might find that Feng’s interpretation was inaccurate， because he neglected the possibility that Confucius’s Heaven can also be understood as the Heaven of principle. Xiong Shili 熊十力 （1885–1968） and his disciples such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995） and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 （1909–1978） were all committed to the reconstruction of metaphysics. Although far from being as precise and subtle as Feng Youlan’s work， Xiong also made an attempt to distinguish between the various meanings of “Heaven.” Mou devoted himself to the creation of a moral metaphysics. He believed that， in the Analects， Confucius temporarily abandoned the tradition of “exploring inherent nature （xing 性） in terms of the ordinances of Heaven （tianming 天命） and the Way of Heaven （tiandao 天道），” and instead set out from the subjective aspect， seeking “benevolence， wisdom， and sagehood” that corresponded to “inherent nature and the Way of Heaven.” “The correspondence between life and the transcendent was similar to religious consciousness. . . . Confucius’s Heaven was more like a ‘Personal God.’” In his early years， Tang Junyi’s understanding of Heaven was overly simple， regarding Heaven as the “natural Heaven” of the objective cosmos. Tang seldom talked about the Analects and the Mencius. Later， Tang reconstructed the ancient Chinese view of the Heaven–human relation in terms of a “metaphysical spiritual substance.” When it came to Confucius’s “Heaven，” he did not regard it as a “natural Heaven，” but instead noted that， although Confucius did not explicitly state that Heaven was a personal god， he hinted at the possibility. Even if Confucius’s concept of Heaven was not a personal god， “it was still an awesome， real， and infinite spiritual life.”
Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 （1927–2012） proposed a “metaphysical Heaven” and showed how it differed from a personal Heaven. Lao noted that，
Pre-Qin Confucianism from Confucius to Mencius was centered on moral subjectivity， and its highest idea was not a “metaphysical Heaven.” . . . Theoretically， this Confucianism did not need a metaphysical Heaven at all. Therefore， we should never say that a metaphysical Heaven was a philosophical concept of Confucius and Mencius.
As far as a “personal Heaven” was concerned， Lao said its main role was in uncontrollable things such as the rise and fall of political power， and it was central not in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius， but rather in Mohism.
Yu Ying-shih 余英时 discussed the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the once-popular Axial breakthrough， arguing that the post-Axial Heaven should be interpreted as a cosmic noumenon （or the Way） based on qi cosmology. Yu was very cautious when talking about the true meaning of Confucius’s concept of Heaven： “Confucius’s original intention was neither ‘the highest moral order of the cosmos，’ which was too impersonal and weak， nor ‘the Lord Above with his will，’ which was too personal and strong. The truth may lie between the two.” As indicated above， the majority of researchers held that Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， and Confucius’s Heaven in particular， were either personal or metaphysical. Those who argued for a personal Heaven held that Confucius had a strongly religious character and thus early Confucianism was tainted with a certain degree of religiosity. If so， the Confucian Way should perhaps be understood not as a reality but as a “belief.” If however Confucius and Mencius’s “Heaven” was viewed in terms of a “metaphysical Heaven” （substance）， the “end of metaphysics” brought about by the “linguistic turn” in the twentieth century would make Confucian scholars feel embarrassed. The results of the linguistic turn gave birth to the two broad movements of analytic philosophy and deconstruction. If one were to apply the logical positivism of analytic philosophy to Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， then Heaven could not be empirically proved， and they would have no alternative but to remain silent. Deconstruction refused logocentrism and denied modes of explanation that aspire for a transcendent origin and ultimate. Under the pressure of such thought， the perception that Heaven is a “metaphysical substance” is untenable.
Abandoning the metaphysical interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， researchers might find that Xu Fuguan 徐復观 （1903–1982） was the only scholar who could directly face the interrogation of modern philosophies. Nevertheless， Xu’s total rejection of metaphysics was problematic. Instead， it was Lao Sze-kwang who asked the question of “whether a philosophy of value， moral philosophy， and philosophy of culture must be dependent on a certain metaphysics，” even though he rejected metaphysical interpretations of Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven. He believed that this was “a significant issue in post-Kantian philosophy，” but one that he himself did not provide with any realistic answer.
Huang Kejian’s “metaphysics of value” was a powerful response to this issue. He noted that logical positivism， analytic philosophy and deconstruction all “resolutely declared the end of metaphysics. Nevertheless， this metaphysics that had come to an end was nothing more than metaphysics of substance in an epistemological dimension.” True metaphysics did not come to an end together with this. The metaphysics that successfully resists the interrogation of the linguistic turn and is reborn is no longer a metaphysics of substance， but rather a metaphysics of value that emerges from humanity’s spiritual aspirations. Humanity’s spiritual aspirations are multidimensional， and behind them， there is the ebb and flow of the “intentions and desires” （yi-yu 意欲） of life. Following closely the Confucian teaching of mind and inherent nature and Kantian transcendental humanism， Huang made “intentions and desires” an origin of value that is more diverse and abundant. The new “intentions and desires” not only included the moral values advocated by Mencius and Kant， but also tried to lay a foundation for values such as wealth and strength， justice， harmony， authenticity， the true， the good， the beautiful， and the sacred. In doing so， a “metaphysics of value” that was inclusive of all values was created. In the new round of exploration of the Heaven–human relation， the highest plane embodying all values was nothing other than Heaven， yet this Heaven was not a substantive Heaven， but rather the ultimate plane sought by the human mind， nor was it a Heaven of normative principle that supports ethical and moral values， but rather a “highest excellence” （zhishan 至善） in which all values are fused together as one. In this sense， this Heaven was both more complete and more holistic. Huang Kejian’s New Interpretation： With a Comparative Exploration of Other Pre-Qin Philosophers [27]
In the light of his metaphysics of value， Huang made a comparative examination of Chinese and Western philosophies， insightfully proceeding from the breakthrough of the humanistic spirit， and boldly asserting that the common ground of civilization in the “Axial Age” was “a concern not with the possible ‘fate’ of humanity， but with the spiritual ‘plane’ that humanity should ultimately reach.” The consciousness of “fate” concerns the outward and conditioned dimension， with a stake in life’s gains and losses， fortune and misfortune. In contrast， “plane” （jingjie 境界） denotes the commencement of the Way and virtue， both of which concern the inward and unconditioned dimension.
Ming 命 （fate） and dao 道 （the Way/plane） are two different dimensions of the consciousness of value. When ming and dao were correlated with a “Heaven” that possessed ultimate significance， they formed the “ordinances of Heaven” （tianming） and the “Way of Heaven” （tiandao）. Thus， if one wishes to explore pre-Qin Chinese thinkers’ views of the Heaven–human relation， they must thoroughly study the thinkers’ selections and definitions of ming and dao. In Huang’s view， the Chinese philosophical shift from ming to dao started with Laozi and Confucius， both of whom centered their teachings on dao. Of course， there were similarities and differences between their teachings. The similarities concerning dao can be found in the attention the two great thinkers’ paid to the original simplicity of human nature. Nevertheless， while Laozi simply wished to remain within this simplicity， Confucianism by contrast wished to make a deliberate departure from it in order to accomplish the edificatory transformation of the humanistic world. Simplicity referred to the “spontaneity” of human nature， through which Laozi formulated his conception of dao and Heaven. Confucius hoped to set out from this natural simplicity， and to cultivate the inkling of “benevolence” originally present in human nature into the “normativity” of the spiritual plane of the sage. In view of this， we might say that Confucius’s dao was a passage from benevolence to sagehood， and his “Heaven” the ultimate spiritual plane of benevolence.
Zigong， one of Confucius’s disciples， said his master seldom talked about human nature and the Way of Heaven. However， there are in fact several records about “Heaven” in the Analects. Huang believed that Confucius’s Heaven was neither a natural Heaven nor a personal god. In the Analects， one passage shows a rarely seen faux pas for Confucius， in which， in sadness and distress upon hearing of the death of Yan Yuan， one of his favorite disciples， he said that Heaven had “abandoned” him. Yan was the most virtuous amongst Confucius’s disciples， yet he unfortunately died young， and his death thus revealed the inconsistency between virtue and fortune. On this occasion， “Confucius’s grief was truly profound. . . . Confucius’s tears and pain represented a farewell. From then on， the spiritual plane of virtue that the Confucians craved pierced through the sense of fate and led humanity into a new era.” Although the new era would still uphold “Heaven，” its meaning had shifted from fate to the Way. In other words， Heaven was no longer a personal god ruling over the fortune and misfortune of humanity， but had rather become a symbol for the highest plane of virtue cultivation. On this basis， Huang disapproved of Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 （179–104 BCE） explanation of the phrase in Analects 3：13 that “One who wrongs Heaven has nowhere to turn for forgiveness，” in which he said that “Heaven is the great lord ruling over the various spirits.” He noted that Confucius’s Heaven was “actually metaphorically compared to righteousness， even though it still took the form of traditional belief.” When interpreting Confucius’s plaint that it was Heaven that knew him perfectly， Huang concluded that this Heaven was not an entity with a will， but the spiritual plane “wherein one whose influence extends as far as possible is called a sage， and the unknowability of the sage is called spirit.” In the Analects， there are quite a few records about Heaven with connotations of “fate.” Huang reinterpreted these from the perspective of a spiritual plane. Take the record about Confucius’s besiegement in Kuang for example. Faced with looming danger， Confucius said： “If Heaven had intended to destroy this culture， then those who came later could not have inherited this culture; if Heaven is not willing to destroy this culture， what can the people of Kuang do to me？” （9：5） Confucius’s confidence in passing on his culture has a strong religious overtone. Huang however argued that “such a religious sense did not lead to a blind cult of or dependence on Heaven or fate and it was， to a great extent， nourished by the virtue of benevolence.” Confucius also said that， amongst the three things that he regarded with awe， there was the ordinance of Heaven. Looking at his own life， Confucius stated that he himself grasped the ordinance of Heaven at fifty （2：4）. Concerning Confucius’s ordinance of Heaven， Huang said that it “can be understood as the historic mission that Heaven entrusted him with， yet this ‘Heaven’ or ‘Heaven above’ was not a substance like ‘the Lord of Heaven，’ but rather a ‘Heaven’ with a connotation of righteousness， to which his sacred mission was attributed.” Moreover， arguing against the view that the Analects’ phrase “Life and death are a matter of fate; wealth and eminence rest with Heaven” （12：5） betrayed Confucius’s fatalism， Huang noted that it was actually “an embodiment of the free and easy spirit of enjoying freedom from concern with longevity and material gain.” Hence for Confucius， although the ordinance of Heaven still had a sacred sense， at the same time， this was not based on the will of a highest deity， but on a value orientation passing from benevolence to sagehood. It is generally held that Mencius was the thinker who truly inherited and carried forward the orthodox Confucian tradition. As Huang saw it， the Mencian view of the Heaven–human relation came down directly from Confucius. This direct lineage was embodied in Mencius’s statement that： “By fully developing one’s mind， one knows one’s nature. Knowing one’s nature， one knows Heaven” （Mencius 7A：1）. Contextually， “mind” denoted the “mind of the four inklings （siduan 四端），” while “nature” denoted the good nature that distinguishes humans from animals. Only when one fully develops one’s mind can one truly understand human nature， and only when one truly understands human nature， can one comprehend Heaven. The mind of the four inklings was granted by Heaven， a passage from Heaven to humanity. When humanity elevates and expands this mind of the four inklings as far as possible， attaining the highest plane， this is a passage from humanity to Heaven. Here， Huang asserted， “Heaven” was still “the ‘Heaven’ of righteousness that was not limited by the narrowness of selfish desires.”
Xunzi， the towering Confucian thinker of the late Warring States period， tried hard to “make clear the distinction between Heaven and humanity，” suggesting that humans “control the ordinances of Heaven and make use of them” （Xunzi， “Discourse on Heaven” [天論]）. Huang believed that Xunzi’s Heaven approached the modern conception of “nature” and had its fixed laws of operation. Only when humanity grasps the Heaven–human distinction， the laws of operation of Heaven and the duties of humanity， can it understand Heaven and know how to control and make use of the ordinances of Heaven. From the human perspective， the Xunzian Heaven was neither a highest authority ruling over the myriad things and giving people a sense of fate， nor Confucius and Mencius’s “Heaven” of benevolence， sagehood and righteousness with its clear moral orientation， but rather something external and objective. The Xunzian Heaven only correlated with the people’s perceptual experience and cognitive reasoning， and had nothing to do with the metaphysical aspirations of human life. Huang’s comparative reexamination of the thoughts of Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzi clearly highlighted the predominant role that Confucius and Mencius’s view of the Heaven–human relation played in pre-Qin Confucianism.
The uniqueness of the Mohist understanding of Heaven was distinctively embodied in its doctrine of the “will of Heaven” （tianzhi 天志）. The will of Heaven， which was strongly religious， served as the ultimate justification for the leading Mohist value orientation of “universal love and reciprocal benefit.” The Mohists made Heaven and supernatural beings all substantialized， and thus taught people to work for universal love and reciprocal benefit. This Mohist endeavor could easily lead to the worship of an external， mystical force， as opposed to the Confucian teaching with its more agreeable cultivation and purification of the human mind. It is true that the Confucian school did not abandon totally sacrificial activities dedicated to supernatural beings， as when Analects 3：12 said， “sacrifice as if present means to sacrifice as if the spirits are present.” Even though Confucians still treated supernatural beings with awe and respect， Confucian sacrifice no longer paid attention to the utilitarian value of the dead and supernatural beings， “but rather concentrated on the cultivation of a spiritual plane of virtue.” Precisely because of their entirely different perceptions of Heaven， Confucianism and Mohism， both of which recognized the teachings of the legendary sage-kings such as Yao and Shun， finally parted company with each other. In conclusion， if Chinese philosophy can be regarded as the learning of Heaven and humanity， Huang attached the greatest importance to Confucius and Mencius’s understanding of Heaven and humanity. In Confucius and Mencius’s views， Heaven was de-substantialized and turned into the highest moral plane that humans seek. As a result， Heaven was completely etherealized. Thanks to Huang’s interpretation， Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation transformed into a “moral metaphysics.” （Although Daoism was also inherently a “moral metaphysics，” the ultimate Daoist goal was not the fulfillment of benevolence that Confucians aspired for， but a return to original moral simplicity.） This Huang-style moral metaphysics was different from that of the modern New Confucians， and its excellence and biasedness were all comprehensively examined from the grand perspective of the metaphysics of value.
The Academic Significance of Huang’s New Interpretation [30]
Huang’s novel interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation in terms of his metaphysics of value offers a possible response to the most fundamental philosophical issue involving the most basic， century-old difference between Chinese and Western philosophies. For Huang Kejian， Confucius and Mencius’s view of Heaven and humanity was a moral metaphysics that was embodied in the metaphysics of value. His interpretation was not a deliberate pursuit of difference， but a difficult and reluctant effort. To be specific， Huang believed that only when a novel interpretation was successfully attained， could the Confucian view of the Heaven–human relation be given a new lease of life in a modern philosophical context.
The moral metaphysics based on the pre-Qin Chinese concept of Heaven and humanity was undoubtedly the core of this. Nevertheless， this did not mean that it was merely a monistic metaphysics of moral value. The metaphysics of value pursued the ultimate realm of “highest excellence，” which referred to the state wherein all values ran in parallel and were fully realized. Of course， Confucianism sought the fulfillment of the highest excellence. However， the Confucian aspiration focused on morality and suffered from a lack of other values， especially “happiness.” To be sure， Confucian sages did not reject happiness. Nevertheless， putting morality first can result in an abstinence that is harmful to human nature， as some later base Confucians advocated. Confucius and Mencius’s exploration of the Heaven–human relation created the Chinese nation’s morally oriented humanistic spirit. Although this spirit is extraordinarily excellent and gracious， it is too lofty to be easily achievable. Depending on personal self-discipline， this spirit can be of assistance in accomplishing the lofty personal plane of gentlemen， sages， and worthy men. However， the ruling class’ arbitrary enforcement of dogmatic ritual codes throughout the whole nation can lead to countless shows of hypocrisy and cruel tragedies. From the perspective of the development of Confucianism， it is imperative to replace this single “highest excellence” with a more inclusive and complete one. The highest excellence aspired after by the metaphysics of value was decisively inspired by the Kantian “consistency of virtue and happiness.” However， in comparison with the Kantian idea， it resolved to realize a more harmoniously perfected value. Contrary to Kant， who retained “the existence of a supreme God，” the new metaphysics of value can only appeal to the justice of the human realm—an important value in the political dimension of human nature—for the fulfillment of the happiness required by the highest excellence. Besides this， the metaphysics of value is also inclusive of diverse values such as aesthetic beauty and seeking truth. It is particularly worth mentioning that amongst these diverse values， there was not necessarily a derivative relationship. Wealth and strength， for instance， does not always bring about justice， aesthetic beauty， and the aspiration for the good; nor was the good always the matrix of the aspiration for beauty and truth; nor could the true be forever the origin of the beautiful and the good. In the metaphysics of value， a great diversity of values are not mutually exclusive. Rather， they mix with one another， complement each other， and blend into a divine realm of the highest excellence.
In the light of this position， Huang criticized the moral metaphysics of the modern New Confucians. His criticism was sincere and to the point. In face of the interrogation of modern philosophies， the modern New Confucians suggested that Confucianism “return to its origin and remold itself” to become adaptable to the modern world. Specifically and metaphorically， Confucianism should strive to develop the new outer kingliness—namely， democracy and science—from the traditional inner sageliness. The conventional Confucian inner sageliness perfected the moral subject， and this moral subject could not be immediately turned into a political and cognitive subject. Consequently， outer kingliness had no way to emerge directly from out of the original inner sageliness. In view of this， the modern New Confucians—Mou Zongsan， for instance—invented methods such as the self-negation of innate moral knowing. Huang believed that Mou’s self-negation of innate moral knowing， rather than being a creative work， was not much more than a logical attitude filling up the gaps in his own theory. Where the philosophy of life was concerned， the modern New Confucians inherited the old Confucian legacy of paying greater attention to morality than happiness， and even attempted to prove that morality was happiness. They thus， Huang concluded， “made a fundamental mistake in reducing multi-dimensional humanistic values into a one-dimensional value.” The leading modern New Confucians such as Xiong Shili， Mou Zongsan， and Tang Junyi were all proponents of a monism of moral value， and their thoughts were typically a moral metaphysics. For this reason， the “Heaven” they discussed was， in the final analysis， a “moral Heaven.” In principle， this moral Heaven could not create a cognitive， aesthetic， and political human， but only a moral human; nor could it guarantee that the virtue and happiness of humanity are consistent， even though the New Confucians themselves were not lacking in relevant logical speculation， aesthetic sentiment， and awareness of rights. The historical course of the evolution of the Confucian concept of Heaven and humanity was startlingly complicated， and in recent decades， it has been repeatedly reinterpreted in the light of modern academic paradigms. It has been observed that there are at least three modern interpretive modes applied to the Confucian unity of Heaven and humanity. The first mode is based on natural science and natural ecology; the second mode is correlated with the history of scholarship; and the third mode is philosophically inspired. According to the first mode， the traditional Heaven–humanity relation was remolded into the relation between nature and humanity， in which nature and humanity were separated from one another， and then reunified. Some said humanity was bound to conquer nature; by contrast， others believed that nature and humanity could coexist in harmony. Such interpretations seem to make the Confucian concept of Heaven–human relation modern. In reality however， the role that Confucianism played in perfecting human virtue as religions did was seriously weakened. Following the second mode， some dug into primary sources and did their best to reconstruct the conceptions of the Heaven–human relation in different historical periods and circumstances. These were actually studies in the Chinese intellectual history. Although such researchers did emphasize the creative reinterpretation of past ideas， they mainly tried their best to accurately represent them， and thus did not shed much light on their contemporary value. As regards the third mode， Xiong Shili proposed the unity of Heaven and humanity through a fusion of ontology， cosmology， and the philosophy of life; Tang Junyi resorted to the paradigm of “metaphysical spiritual substance” in reexamining Heaven; while Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 （1895–1984） together with his student Zhang Shiying 張世英 applied the seamless integration of subject and object to the unity of Heaven and humanity. As discussed above， inasmuch as Xiong and Tang held that “Heaven” was nothing but a spiritual substance， their assertions were unable to withstand the interrogations of the linguistic turn. The Jin- and Zhang-style subject–object dichotomy or oneness of subject and object were all epistemological views， and Heaven in their interpretations was regarded as a holistic nature， a view that deviated from the Confucian tradition of “accomplishing virtue.” Their work was indeed creative; but on the other hand， it was hardly Confucian in the original sense. Unlike the aforementioned modern New Confucians， Huang tried his best to retain the original nature of Confucianism as far as possible in his reexaminations of Confucius and Mencius’s view of Heaven and humanity. At the same time， he made due effort to set forth the Confucian elements in conformity with modernity. Needless to say， Huang as an interpreter inevitably had some preconceived notions and well-meaningly misread Confucianism on some occasions. Overall however， Huang did an excellent job in proposing a groundbreaking reinterpretation of the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the metaphysics of value， and his creative expansion and promotion of Confucius and Mencius distinguished him among modern Chinese scholars. Due to his more complete understanding of “humanity” and his more thorough observation of the history of philosophy， Huang’s reinterpretation sounds both more philosophical and more compassionate in the Confucian sense. Thanks to Huang’s endeavor， the essence of the pre-Qin views of Heaven and humanity can be extracted， its potential bias correctly detected and properly rectified in the light of the redefined highest excellence. It has thus obtained a new lease of life in the present-day world.
Bibliography of Cited Translations
Bloom， Irene， trans. Mencius. New York： Columbia University Press， 2009.
Legge， James， trans. Liji. https：//ctext.org/liji/da-xue/ens， accessed May 25， 2020.
Watson， Burton， trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York： Columbia University Press， 2007.
Translated by Chi Zhen
Keywords： Confucius， Mencius， Heaven–human relation， metaphysics of value
The Heaven–human relation is one of the most significant questions of pre-Qin Chinese philosophy， and the one upon which Confucius and Mencius shed the deepest light. Metaphysics was once an important early modern approach to its interpretation. However， since the twentieth century， the dilemma of the “end of metaphysics” forces us to rethink this approach. Devoted to reconstructing metaphysics， Huang Kejian 黃克剑 creatively proposes the idea of a “metaphysics of value.” This paper attempts to review Huang’s interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the metaphysics of value， hoping to provide something helpful to the field.
Modern Interpretations of Confucius and Mencius’s
Concept of Heaven [Refer to page 25 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
It is generally held that the concepts of Heaven and humanity changed dramatically during the Shang （1600–1046 BCE） and Zhou （1046–256 BCE） dynasties. Modern scholars’ understanding of Confucius and Mencius’s concept of Heaven and human are mainly based on this consensus. Nevertheless， their specific interpretations are highly diverse， because the starting points of their theories differ from one another.
Feng Youlan 冯友兰 （1895–1990） said there were five meanings of “Heaven” （tian 天） in Chinese texts. Specifically， there was the material Heaven （the Heaven often spoken of in opposition to Earth）， the ruling Heaven （the anthropomorphic Heaven）， the fatalistic Heaven （applied to all those events in human life over which man himself has no control）， the naturalistic Heaven （equivalent to the English term Nature）， and the moral Heaven （the highest principle of the cosmos）. Feng concluded that Heaven in the Analects always referred to the ruling/presiding Heaven. Consciously， Feng made subtle distinctions between the meanings of Heaven. Undoubtedly this was a commendable endeavor. Nevertheless， if one examines the text of the Analects in detail， one might find that Feng’s interpretation was inaccurate， because he neglected the possibility that Confucius’s Heaven can also be understood as the Heaven of principle. Xiong Shili 熊十力 （1885–1968） and his disciples such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995） and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 （1909–1978） were all committed to the reconstruction of metaphysics. Although far from being as precise and subtle as Feng Youlan’s work， Xiong also made an attempt to distinguish between the various meanings of “Heaven.” Mou devoted himself to the creation of a moral metaphysics. He believed that， in the Analects， Confucius temporarily abandoned the tradition of “exploring inherent nature （xing 性） in terms of the ordinances of Heaven （tianming 天命） and the Way of Heaven （tiandao 天道），” and instead set out from the subjective aspect， seeking “benevolence， wisdom， and sagehood” that corresponded to “inherent nature and the Way of Heaven.” “The correspondence between life and the transcendent was similar to religious consciousness. . . . Confucius’s Heaven was more like a ‘Personal God.’” In his early years， Tang Junyi’s understanding of Heaven was overly simple， regarding Heaven as the “natural Heaven” of the objective cosmos. Tang seldom talked about the Analects and the Mencius. Later， Tang reconstructed the ancient Chinese view of the Heaven–human relation in terms of a “metaphysical spiritual substance.” When it came to Confucius’s “Heaven，” he did not regard it as a “natural Heaven，” but instead noted that， although Confucius did not explicitly state that Heaven was a personal god， he hinted at the possibility. Even if Confucius’s concept of Heaven was not a personal god， “it was still an awesome， real， and infinite spiritual life.”
Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 （1927–2012） proposed a “metaphysical Heaven” and showed how it differed from a personal Heaven. Lao noted that，
Pre-Qin Confucianism from Confucius to Mencius was centered on moral subjectivity， and its highest idea was not a “metaphysical Heaven.” . . . Theoretically， this Confucianism did not need a metaphysical Heaven at all. Therefore， we should never say that a metaphysical Heaven was a philosophical concept of Confucius and Mencius.
As far as a “personal Heaven” was concerned， Lao said its main role was in uncontrollable things such as the rise and fall of political power， and it was central not in the teachings of Confucius and Mencius， but rather in Mohism.
Yu Ying-shih 余英时 discussed the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the once-popular Axial breakthrough， arguing that the post-Axial Heaven should be interpreted as a cosmic noumenon （or the Way） based on qi cosmology. Yu was very cautious when talking about the true meaning of Confucius’s concept of Heaven： “Confucius’s original intention was neither ‘the highest moral order of the cosmos，’ which was too impersonal and weak， nor ‘the Lord Above with his will，’ which was too personal and strong. The truth may lie between the two.” As indicated above， the majority of researchers held that Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， and Confucius’s Heaven in particular， were either personal or metaphysical. Those who argued for a personal Heaven held that Confucius had a strongly religious character and thus early Confucianism was tainted with a certain degree of religiosity. If so， the Confucian Way should perhaps be understood not as a reality but as a “belief.” If however Confucius and Mencius’s “Heaven” was viewed in terms of a “metaphysical Heaven” （substance）， the “end of metaphysics” brought about by the “linguistic turn” in the twentieth century would make Confucian scholars feel embarrassed. The results of the linguistic turn gave birth to the two broad movements of analytic philosophy and deconstruction. If one were to apply the logical positivism of analytic philosophy to Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， then Heaven could not be empirically proved， and they would have no alternative but to remain silent. Deconstruction refused logocentrism and denied modes of explanation that aspire for a transcendent origin and ultimate. Under the pressure of such thought， the perception that Heaven is a “metaphysical substance” is untenable.
Abandoning the metaphysical interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven， researchers might find that Xu Fuguan 徐復观 （1903–1982） was the only scholar who could directly face the interrogation of modern philosophies. Nevertheless， Xu’s total rejection of metaphysics was problematic. Instead， it was Lao Sze-kwang who asked the question of “whether a philosophy of value， moral philosophy， and philosophy of culture must be dependent on a certain metaphysics，” even though he rejected metaphysical interpretations of Confucius and Mencius’s Heaven. He believed that this was “a significant issue in post-Kantian philosophy，” but one that he himself did not provide with any realistic answer.
Huang Kejian’s “metaphysics of value” was a powerful response to this issue. He noted that logical positivism， analytic philosophy and deconstruction all “resolutely declared the end of metaphysics. Nevertheless， this metaphysics that had come to an end was nothing more than metaphysics of substance in an epistemological dimension.” True metaphysics did not come to an end together with this. The metaphysics that successfully resists the interrogation of the linguistic turn and is reborn is no longer a metaphysics of substance， but rather a metaphysics of value that emerges from humanity’s spiritual aspirations. Humanity’s spiritual aspirations are multidimensional， and behind them， there is the ebb and flow of the “intentions and desires” （yi-yu 意欲） of life. Following closely the Confucian teaching of mind and inherent nature and Kantian transcendental humanism， Huang made “intentions and desires” an origin of value that is more diverse and abundant. The new “intentions and desires” not only included the moral values advocated by Mencius and Kant， but also tried to lay a foundation for values such as wealth and strength， justice， harmony， authenticity， the true， the good， the beautiful， and the sacred. In doing so， a “metaphysics of value” that was inclusive of all values was created. In the new round of exploration of the Heaven–human relation， the highest plane embodying all values was nothing other than Heaven， yet this Heaven was not a substantive Heaven， but rather the ultimate plane sought by the human mind， nor was it a Heaven of normative principle that supports ethical and moral values， but rather a “highest excellence” （zhishan 至善） in which all values are fused together as one. In this sense， this Heaven was both more complete and more holistic. Huang Kejian’s New Interpretation： With a Comparative Exploration of Other Pre-Qin Philosophers [27]
In the light of his metaphysics of value， Huang made a comparative examination of Chinese and Western philosophies， insightfully proceeding from the breakthrough of the humanistic spirit， and boldly asserting that the common ground of civilization in the “Axial Age” was “a concern not with the possible ‘fate’ of humanity， but with the spiritual ‘plane’ that humanity should ultimately reach.” The consciousness of “fate” concerns the outward and conditioned dimension， with a stake in life’s gains and losses， fortune and misfortune. In contrast， “plane” （jingjie 境界） denotes the commencement of the Way and virtue， both of which concern the inward and unconditioned dimension.
Ming 命 （fate） and dao 道 （the Way/plane） are two different dimensions of the consciousness of value. When ming and dao were correlated with a “Heaven” that possessed ultimate significance， they formed the “ordinances of Heaven” （tianming） and the “Way of Heaven” （tiandao）. Thus， if one wishes to explore pre-Qin Chinese thinkers’ views of the Heaven–human relation， they must thoroughly study the thinkers’ selections and definitions of ming and dao. In Huang’s view， the Chinese philosophical shift from ming to dao started with Laozi and Confucius， both of whom centered their teachings on dao. Of course， there were similarities and differences between their teachings. The similarities concerning dao can be found in the attention the two great thinkers’ paid to the original simplicity of human nature. Nevertheless， while Laozi simply wished to remain within this simplicity， Confucianism by contrast wished to make a deliberate departure from it in order to accomplish the edificatory transformation of the humanistic world. Simplicity referred to the “spontaneity” of human nature， through which Laozi formulated his conception of dao and Heaven. Confucius hoped to set out from this natural simplicity， and to cultivate the inkling of “benevolence” originally present in human nature into the “normativity” of the spiritual plane of the sage. In view of this， we might say that Confucius’s dao was a passage from benevolence to sagehood， and his “Heaven” the ultimate spiritual plane of benevolence.
Zigong， one of Confucius’s disciples， said his master seldom talked about human nature and the Way of Heaven. However， there are in fact several records about “Heaven” in the Analects. Huang believed that Confucius’s Heaven was neither a natural Heaven nor a personal god. In the Analects， one passage shows a rarely seen faux pas for Confucius， in which， in sadness and distress upon hearing of the death of Yan Yuan， one of his favorite disciples， he said that Heaven had “abandoned” him. Yan was the most virtuous amongst Confucius’s disciples， yet he unfortunately died young， and his death thus revealed the inconsistency between virtue and fortune. On this occasion， “Confucius’s grief was truly profound. . . . Confucius’s tears and pain represented a farewell. From then on， the spiritual plane of virtue that the Confucians craved pierced through the sense of fate and led humanity into a new era.” Although the new era would still uphold “Heaven，” its meaning had shifted from fate to the Way. In other words， Heaven was no longer a personal god ruling over the fortune and misfortune of humanity， but had rather become a symbol for the highest plane of virtue cultivation. On this basis， Huang disapproved of Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒 （179–104 BCE） explanation of the phrase in Analects 3：13 that “One who wrongs Heaven has nowhere to turn for forgiveness，” in which he said that “Heaven is the great lord ruling over the various spirits.” He noted that Confucius’s Heaven was “actually metaphorically compared to righteousness， even though it still took the form of traditional belief.” When interpreting Confucius’s plaint that it was Heaven that knew him perfectly， Huang concluded that this Heaven was not an entity with a will， but the spiritual plane “wherein one whose influence extends as far as possible is called a sage， and the unknowability of the sage is called spirit.” In the Analects， there are quite a few records about Heaven with connotations of “fate.” Huang reinterpreted these from the perspective of a spiritual plane. Take the record about Confucius’s besiegement in Kuang for example. Faced with looming danger， Confucius said： “If Heaven had intended to destroy this culture， then those who came later could not have inherited this culture; if Heaven is not willing to destroy this culture， what can the people of Kuang do to me？” （9：5） Confucius’s confidence in passing on his culture has a strong religious overtone. Huang however argued that “such a religious sense did not lead to a blind cult of or dependence on Heaven or fate and it was， to a great extent， nourished by the virtue of benevolence.” Confucius also said that， amongst the three things that he regarded with awe， there was the ordinance of Heaven. Looking at his own life， Confucius stated that he himself grasped the ordinance of Heaven at fifty （2：4）. Concerning Confucius’s ordinance of Heaven， Huang said that it “can be understood as the historic mission that Heaven entrusted him with， yet this ‘Heaven’ or ‘Heaven above’ was not a substance like ‘the Lord of Heaven，’ but rather a ‘Heaven’ with a connotation of righteousness， to which his sacred mission was attributed.” Moreover， arguing against the view that the Analects’ phrase “Life and death are a matter of fate; wealth and eminence rest with Heaven” （12：5） betrayed Confucius’s fatalism， Huang noted that it was actually “an embodiment of the free and easy spirit of enjoying freedom from concern with longevity and material gain.” Hence for Confucius， although the ordinance of Heaven still had a sacred sense， at the same time， this was not based on the will of a highest deity， but on a value orientation passing from benevolence to sagehood. It is generally held that Mencius was the thinker who truly inherited and carried forward the orthodox Confucian tradition. As Huang saw it， the Mencian view of the Heaven–human relation came down directly from Confucius. This direct lineage was embodied in Mencius’s statement that： “By fully developing one’s mind， one knows one’s nature. Knowing one’s nature， one knows Heaven” （Mencius 7A：1）. Contextually， “mind” denoted the “mind of the four inklings （siduan 四端），” while “nature” denoted the good nature that distinguishes humans from animals. Only when one fully develops one’s mind can one truly understand human nature， and only when one truly understands human nature， can one comprehend Heaven. The mind of the four inklings was granted by Heaven， a passage from Heaven to humanity. When humanity elevates and expands this mind of the four inklings as far as possible， attaining the highest plane， this is a passage from humanity to Heaven. Here， Huang asserted， “Heaven” was still “the ‘Heaven’ of righteousness that was not limited by the narrowness of selfish desires.”
Xunzi， the towering Confucian thinker of the late Warring States period， tried hard to “make clear the distinction between Heaven and humanity，” suggesting that humans “control the ordinances of Heaven and make use of them” （Xunzi， “Discourse on Heaven” [天論]）. Huang believed that Xunzi’s Heaven approached the modern conception of “nature” and had its fixed laws of operation. Only when humanity grasps the Heaven–human distinction， the laws of operation of Heaven and the duties of humanity， can it understand Heaven and know how to control and make use of the ordinances of Heaven. From the human perspective， the Xunzian Heaven was neither a highest authority ruling over the myriad things and giving people a sense of fate， nor Confucius and Mencius’s “Heaven” of benevolence， sagehood and righteousness with its clear moral orientation， but rather something external and objective. The Xunzian Heaven only correlated with the people’s perceptual experience and cognitive reasoning， and had nothing to do with the metaphysical aspirations of human life. Huang’s comparative reexamination of the thoughts of Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzi clearly highlighted the predominant role that Confucius and Mencius’s view of the Heaven–human relation played in pre-Qin Confucianism.
The uniqueness of the Mohist understanding of Heaven was distinctively embodied in its doctrine of the “will of Heaven” （tianzhi 天志）. The will of Heaven， which was strongly religious， served as the ultimate justification for the leading Mohist value orientation of “universal love and reciprocal benefit.” The Mohists made Heaven and supernatural beings all substantialized， and thus taught people to work for universal love and reciprocal benefit. This Mohist endeavor could easily lead to the worship of an external， mystical force， as opposed to the Confucian teaching with its more agreeable cultivation and purification of the human mind. It is true that the Confucian school did not abandon totally sacrificial activities dedicated to supernatural beings， as when Analects 3：12 said， “sacrifice as if present means to sacrifice as if the spirits are present.” Even though Confucians still treated supernatural beings with awe and respect， Confucian sacrifice no longer paid attention to the utilitarian value of the dead and supernatural beings， “but rather concentrated on the cultivation of a spiritual plane of virtue.” Precisely because of their entirely different perceptions of Heaven， Confucianism and Mohism， both of which recognized the teachings of the legendary sage-kings such as Yao and Shun， finally parted company with each other. In conclusion， if Chinese philosophy can be regarded as the learning of Heaven and humanity， Huang attached the greatest importance to Confucius and Mencius’s understanding of Heaven and humanity. In Confucius and Mencius’s views， Heaven was de-substantialized and turned into the highest moral plane that humans seek. As a result， Heaven was completely etherealized. Thanks to Huang’s interpretation， Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation transformed into a “moral metaphysics.” （Although Daoism was also inherently a “moral metaphysics，” the ultimate Daoist goal was not the fulfillment of benevolence that Confucians aspired for， but a return to original moral simplicity.） This Huang-style moral metaphysics was different from that of the modern New Confucians， and its excellence and biasedness were all comprehensively examined from the grand perspective of the metaphysics of value.
The Academic Significance of Huang’s New Interpretation [30]
Huang’s novel interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s views of the Heaven–human relation in terms of his metaphysics of value offers a possible response to the most fundamental philosophical issue involving the most basic， century-old difference between Chinese and Western philosophies. For Huang Kejian， Confucius and Mencius’s view of Heaven and humanity was a moral metaphysics that was embodied in the metaphysics of value. His interpretation was not a deliberate pursuit of difference， but a difficult and reluctant effort. To be specific， Huang believed that only when a novel interpretation was successfully attained， could the Confucian view of the Heaven–human relation be given a new lease of life in a modern philosophical context.
The moral metaphysics based on the pre-Qin Chinese concept of Heaven and humanity was undoubtedly the core of this. Nevertheless， this did not mean that it was merely a monistic metaphysics of moral value. The metaphysics of value pursued the ultimate realm of “highest excellence，” which referred to the state wherein all values ran in parallel and were fully realized. Of course， Confucianism sought the fulfillment of the highest excellence. However， the Confucian aspiration focused on morality and suffered from a lack of other values， especially “happiness.” To be sure， Confucian sages did not reject happiness. Nevertheless， putting morality first can result in an abstinence that is harmful to human nature， as some later base Confucians advocated. Confucius and Mencius’s exploration of the Heaven–human relation created the Chinese nation’s morally oriented humanistic spirit. Although this spirit is extraordinarily excellent and gracious， it is too lofty to be easily achievable. Depending on personal self-discipline， this spirit can be of assistance in accomplishing the lofty personal plane of gentlemen， sages， and worthy men. However， the ruling class’ arbitrary enforcement of dogmatic ritual codes throughout the whole nation can lead to countless shows of hypocrisy and cruel tragedies. From the perspective of the development of Confucianism， it is imperative to replace this single “highest excellence” with a more inclusive and complete one. The highest excellence aspired after by the metaphysics of value was decisively inspired by the Kantian “consistency of virtue and happiness.” However， in comparison with the Kantian idea， it resolved to realize a more harmoniously perfected value. Contrary to Kant， who retained “the existence of a supreme God，” the new metaphysics of value can only appeal to the justice of the human realm—an important value in the political dimension of human nature—for the fulfillment of the happiness required by the highest excellence. Besides this， the metaphysics of value is also inclusive of diverse values such as aesthetic beauty and seeking truth. It is particularly worth mentioning that amongst these diverse values， there was not necessarily a derivative relationship. Wealth and strength， for instance， does not always bring about justice， aesthetic beauty， and the aspiration for the good; nor was the good always the matrix of the aspiration for beauty and truth; nor could the true be forever the origin of the beautiful and the good. In the metaphysics of value， a great diversity of values are not mutually exclusive. Rather， they mix with one another， complement each other， and blend into a divine realm of the highest excellence.
In the light of this position， Huang criticized the moral metaphysics of the modern New Confucians. His criticism was sincere and to the point. In face of the interrogation of modern philosophies， the modern New Confucians suggested that Confucianism “return to its origin and remold itself” to become adaptable to the modern world. Specifically and metaphorically， Confucianism should strive to develop the new outer kingliness—namely， democracy and science—from the traditional inner sageliness. The conventional Confucian inner sageliness perfected the moral subject， and this moral subject could not be immediately turned into a political and cognitive subject. Consequently， outer kingliness had no way to emerge directly from out of the original inner sageliness. In view of this， the modern New Confucians—Mou Zongsan， for instance—invented methods such as the self-negation of innate moral knowing. Huang believed that Mou’s self-negation of innate moral knowing， rather than being a creative work， was not much more than a logical attitude filling up the gaps in his own theory. Where the philosophy of life was concerned， the modern New Confucians inherited the old Confucian legacy of paying greater attention to morality than happiness， and even attempted to prove that morality was happiness. They thus， Huang concluded， “made a fundamental mistake in reducing multi-dimensional humanistic values into a one-dimensional value.” The leading modern New Confucians such as Xiong Shili， Mou Zongsan， and Tang Junyi were all proponents of a monism of moral value， and their thoughts were typically a moral metaphysics. For this reason， the “Heaven” they discussed was， in the final analysis， a “moral Heaven.” In principle， this moral Heaven could not create a cognitive， aesthetic， and political human， but only a moral human; nor could it guarantee that the virtue and happiness of humanity are consistent， even though the New Confucians themselves were not lacking in relevant logical speculation， aesthetic sentiment， and awareness of rights. The historical course of the evolution of the Confucian concept of Heaven and humanity was startlingly complicated， and in recent decades， it has been repeatedly reinterpreted in the light of modern academic paradigms. It has been observed that there are at least three modern interpretive modes applied to the Confucian unity of Heaven and humanity. The first mode is based on natural science and natural ecology; the second mode is correlated with the history of scholarship; and the third mode is philosophically inspired. According to the first mode， the traditional Heaven–humanity relation was remolded into the relation between nature and humanity， in which nature and humanity were separated from one another， and then reunified. Some said humanity was bound to conquer nature; by contrast， others believed that nature and humanity could coexist in harmony. Such interpretations seem to make the Confucian concept of Heaven–human relation modern. In reality however， the role that Confucianism played in perfecting human virtue as religions did was seriously weakened. Following the second mode， some dug into primary sources and did their best to reconstruct the conceptions of the Heaven–human relation in different historical periods and circumstances. These were actually studies in the Chinese intellectual history. Although such researchers did emphasize the creative reinterpretation of past ideas， they mainly tried their best to accurately represent them， and thus did not shed much light on their contemporary value. As regards the third mode， Xiong Shili proposed the unity of Heaven and humanity through a fusion of ontology， cosmology， and the philosophy of life; Tang Junyi resorted to the paradigm of “metaphysical spiritual substance” in reexamining Heaven; while Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 （1895–1984） together with his student Zhang Shiying 張世英 applied the seamless integration of subject and object to the unity of Heaven and humanity. As discussed above， inasmuch as Xiong and Tang held that “Heaven” was nothing but a spiritual substance， their assertions were unable to withstand the interrogations of the linguistic turn. The Jin- and Zhang-style subject–object dichotomy or oneness of subject and object were all epistemological views， and Heaven in their interpretations was regarded as a holistic nature， a view that deviated from the Confucian tradition of “accomplishing virtue.” Their work was indeed creative; but on the other hand， it was hardly Confucian in the original sense. Unlike the aforementioned modern New Confucians， Huang tried his best to retain the original nature of Confucianism as far as possible in his reexaminations of Confucius and Mencius’s view of Heaven and humanity. At the same time， he made due effort to set forth the Confucian elements in conformity with modernity. Needless to say， Huang as an interpreter inevitably had some preconceived notions and well-meaningly misread Confucianism on some occasions. Overall however， Huang did an excellent job in proposing a groundbreaking reinterpretation of the Heaven–human relation from the perspective of the metaphysics of value， and his creative expansion and promotion of Confucius and Mencius distinguished him among modern Chinese scholars. Due to his more complete understanding of “humanity” and his more thorough observation of the history of philosophy， Huang’s reinterpretation sounds both more philosophical and more compassionate in the Confucian sense. Thanks to Huang’s endeavor， the essence of the pre-Qin views of Heaven and humanity can be extracted， its potential bias correctly detected and properly rectified in the light of the redefined highest excellence. It has thus obtained a new lease of life in the present-day world.
Bibliography of Cited Translations
Bloom， Irene， trans. Mencius. New York： Columbia University Press， 2009.
Legge， James， trans. Liji. https：//ctext.org/liji/da-xue/ens， accessed May 25， 2020.
Watson， Burton， trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York： Columbia University Press， 2007.
Translated by Chi Zhen