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Abstract： Historically， the Neo-Confucian school of mind （xinxue） tended to substitute a theory of mind as the original substance for the traditional theory of giving that primacy to Heaven. The dynamic behind this significant turn was the Song–Ming Neo-Confucians’ conscious or unconscious borrowing from Chan Buddhism. The Chan tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the self-existent pure mind was an important resource for the xinxue interpretation of Mencius’s concept of original mind. The Chan doctrine of understanding human nature and the mind by sitting still in meditative introspection inspired the xinxue philosophers’ with their theory of experiencing the unaroused state of mind and illumining the original mind， which exerted further influence on their ontological view of the cosmos. The inward turn of the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind from Heaven to the mind as the original substance highlighted human mind’s self-aware and self-contained subjectivity and weakens their commitment to the objective reality of Heaven and Earth， thus strengthening the role played in their thought by Confucian inner sageliness and its religious nature and downplaying Confucian outer kingliness and intellectuality.
Keywords： Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind， xinxue， Heaven as the original substance， mind as the original substance， Chan
Under the strong influence of Chan Buddhism， both the court and the commoners in the Song dynasty （960–1279） were pervaded with an atmosphere for blending Confucianism and Buddhism in pursuit of self-cultivation. This is the cultural and ideological soil where the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind （xinxue 心學） began to germinate. Thanks to a group of Southern Song Neo-Confucians’ efforts， represented by Zhang Jiucheng 张九成 （1092–1159） and Lu Xiangshan 陆象山 （1139–1193， a.k.a. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊）， xinxue kept on growing day by day into a Neo-Confucian school which stood up as an equal to Cheng Yi 程颐 （1033–1107） and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 （1130–1200） school of principle （lixue 理学）. As the xinxue philosophers gradually converted the concept of Heaven as the original substance in traditional Confucianism into that of mind as the original substance， the Confucian moral original mind， to some extent or in some form， became much closer to the Chan tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the self-existent pure mind.
Heaven as the Original Substance in Traditional Confucianism [Refer to page 60 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
As its name suggests， xinxue centers on the mind. Within Confucianism before the Northern Song， the concept of Heaven as the original substance had always been absolutely dominant. In that tradition， the character tian 天 had three basic meanings： Heaven as the master （主宰之天）， Heaven as moral nature （德性之天）， and natural heaven （自然之天）. All these referred not only to the total foundation for the generation and transformation of the myriad things but also to the material basis humankind depended on for its subsistence and development， and furthermore to the ultimate source from which the human moral consciousness originated. Of course， usually these three meanings of tian are hardly distinguishable in the texts of Confucian classics. For example， as recorded in the Analects， Confucius said， “Does tian speak？ The four seasons pursue their courses and all things are continually being produced， but does tian say anything？” and “Tian produced the virtue that is in me， but Huan Tui 桓魋， what can he do to me？” （Analects 7：23）. However， no matter whether Confucius said tian in the sense of natural heaven， moral Heaven， or religious Heaven， it does not hamper it from meaning the foundation for the subsistence of the myriad things and the source of human value. If measured by the concept of noumenon in the Western philosophy， among traditional Confucian concepts， perhaps only tian can be regarded as noumenon in the sense. As noted by modern Chinese scholars such as Li Zehou 李澤厚 and Charles Wei-Hsun Fu 傅伟勋 （1933–1996）， Confucianism’s concept of tian with the virtue of production and reproduction of life resulted only from its projection of human emotion， values， and ideas into nature and therefore must be based on the human mind as its precondition. However， this modern interpretation of it in the genetic sense does not conform to the fundamental spirit and cognitive model of traditional Confucianism.
In pre-Qin Confucianism， what was indeed lightly tinted with the idea of mind as the original substance is the thought of Mencius. According to Mencius， the mind was not only a thinking organ with cognitive function， but， more importantly， the moral subject with intuitive knowledge and intuitive capacity， of which he said， “All things are already complete in me. There is no greater delight than being conscious of sincerity on self-examination.” But the question is： how could these outside objective “things” be “complete” in the subjective “me” or “my mind”？ This was also a topic of incessant polemics among later Confucians. In light of Mencius’s theory of human nature， what is more fundamental than the mind is human nature， and this was seen as the transcendental essence innate in humankind， which makes it what it is. What belongs by his nature to the superior man （junzi 君子） cannot be increased by the largeness of his sphere of action， nor diminished by his dwelling in poverty and retirement， for the reason that it is determinately apportioned to him by Heaven. What belongs by his nature to the Superior Man are humanity， righteousness， propriety， and wisdom， which are rooted in his mind. （Mencius 7A：21）
To him， the original mind was the emanation and function of human nature， which represented the experiential reality of moral consciousness. According to Mencius， the original mind， which embraced such positive feelings as the feeling of commiseration and of shame and dislike， was nothing but the beginning of human nature， and his proposition that “all men may be Yaos and Shuns”i （6B：2） was made in regard to human nature rather than to the mind. The Song–Ming xinxue philosophers， influenced by the Chan theory of the mind and human nature， tied its concept of profoundly enlightened mind to Mencius’s concept of the original mind and let the mystic experience gained in contemplation and Mencius’s “all things are already complete in me” verify each other， believing that they had regained the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius which had been lost for over a thousand years. However， in essence， what they did is only a creative interpretation of Mencius’s doctrine of the mind.
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995） opined，
Mencius said that humankind possesses the original mind. This original mind is the same as human nature， and it is the tiny point by which humankind differs from the lower animals. The moral consciousness is very sincere and affable. Mencius manifested the moral consciousness， but he did not reveal completely the absolute universality of original mind.
Mou identified Mencius’s original mind with human nature， but this is open to discussion. When Mencius said， “He who has exerted his mind to the utmost knows his nature. When knowing his nature， he knows Heaven” （Mencius 7A：1）， he noted the very difference between the mind and the human nature and tian in regard to whether there was exertion to the utmost or not. If we， as those Neo-Confucian philosophers of the mind did， equated directly original mind with human nature which was subject to neither increase nor decrease， the original mind would never be lost， and then there would be no such issues as “seeking the lost mind” （6A：11） and “losing one’s original mind” （6A：10）. According to Mou， Mencius’s so-called absolute original mind， actually referred to the transcendental mind as the original substance， that is， the free and infinite mind endowed with intellectual intuition. Obviously Mou subscribed to the Chan-colored understanding held by the Song–Ming xinxue philosophers in his interpreting Mencius. As a matter of fact， under the historical backdrop of pre-Qin Confucianism， the absoluteness of Mencius’s concept of original mind could by no means be revealed completely， since Mencius’s concept of original mind was based on the moral emotion of actual ethics rather than the intuitive knowledge which， as Wang Yangming 王陽明 （1472–1528） claimed， was subject to no distinction between good and evil， found nothing equal to it， and created heaven and earth. In addition， in Mencius’s theory of the mind and nature， there is a more fundamental concept than the mind and nature， namely tian. When Mencius said， “Humanity， righteousness， propriety， and wisdom are not infused into us from without” （6A：6）， he was emphasizing the innateness of human moral consciousness， and clearly here he followed Confucius， who had said “tian produced the virtue that is in me” （Analects 7：23） and agreed with the Doctrine of the Mean which says， “What Heaven has conferred is called the nature.” According to this understanding， Mencius was still a proponent of Heaven as the original substance， rather than of the mind as the original substance. From Heaven to Mind as the Original Substance [62]
Before the Northern Song， Confucianism was based on Heaven as the original substance and had not undergone any fundamental change. However， in Neo-Confucian xinxue， the mind replaced Heaven as the original substance and was taken as the true source of all values in the world and even of the myriad things therein. Generally speaking， the theory of mind as the original substance had to do with a host of Neo-Confucians who “immersed themselves into the theories of various schools of thought， spent several decades studying the doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism， and then emerged and returned to the Six Classicsii， and finally attained accomplishment.”
As a forerunner of the philosophy of the mind， Cheng Hao 程顥 （1032–1085） emphasized mind as master and commander：
Heaven and humankind are originally not two， so there is no need to speaking of combining them.
The mind is the very Heaven; to exert the mind to the utmost is to know human nature， and to know human nature is to know Heaven. Whenever one is， he can realize it and should never turn to the external and seek for it.
Of course， he spoke of Heaven and humankind as one in regard to mind’s capacity for sympathetic connection （感通）， but in his philosophy， the supreme original substance was still Heaven or Heavenly principle， not the mind. His theory was only a little inclined to xinxue. His younger brother Cheng Yi 程颐 （1033–1107）， in his attempt to reject the nothingness preached by Buddhism and Daoism， was more emphatic of the objective reality of Heavenly principle， indicating his inheritance of traditional Confucianism’s concept of Heaven as principle （义理之天）. He said， “Heaven possesses the principle and the sage goes by following it， which is the so called Way （dao 道）. The sage follows Heaven， while Buddhists follow the mind.” Here in a nutshell he made clear the difference between the basic positions of Confucians and Buddhists on original substance. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi’s disciples， such as Xie Liangzuo 谢良佐 （1050–1103） and Yang Shi 杨时 （1053–1135）， drew on the Chan theory of the mind and nature more or less， but in regard to the interrelation among the mind， nature， Heaven， and principle， they largely continued their teachers’ theory， seeing Heavenly principle as the supreme existence above the myriad things. Hence they did not build a true theory of mind as the original substance.
It is due to the Confucians not long after them， such as Zhang Jiucheng and Lu Xiangshan， that Confucian notions of original substance began to incline from Heaven toward mind in varying degrees. What these figures had in common was that they highlighted the original mind’s completeness and self-containment， void luminance and supreme goodness， and its being subject to neither generation nor extinction. As Zhang said， All the myriad things in the world are born of the mind. . . . As regards its great substance， all Heaven and Earth， yin and yang operate as the variants of the principle within the scope it defines， and as regards the great function， all the work of nature which displays subtle ingenuity occurs with impetus from it.
Lu Xiangshan made many well-known propositions such as “the universe is my mind and my mind is the universe.” Though they did not deny the status of Heavenly principle as the original substance of the universe， when they emphasized that Heavenly principle was born of the mind or the mind was the same as principle， they saw the mind as an existence more fundamental than Heavenly principle. Furthermore， Yang Jian 楊简 （1141–1226） claimed，
Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth， and change and transformation are my change and transformation. None of them are external to me. . . . Heaven is the image in my nature and Earth is the form in my nature， so when the Book of Changes says “in Heaven there is formed the image， and in Earth there is produced the form，” it refers to nothing but me.
Wang Yangming went further and put forth such propositions as “outside the mind， there is neither any principle， nor any thing， nor any affair.” Later， Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 （1578–1645） said， “The Buddhist doctrine is one of the original mind and the Confucian doctrine is also one of the original mind.” Thus it has to be concluded that in the Song–Ming philosophy of mind， the Confucian theory of original substance underwent some variation.
This change of original substance from Heaven to the mind brought about by xinxue thinkers has obviously to do with some of them drawing on Chan. Mencius’s propositions such as “all things are already complete in me” had been like thousand-year puzzles until these philosophers turned to sitting still in Chan-style meditative introspection to cultivate the mind and nature. Lu Xiangshan’s “the universe is my mind and my mind is the universe” was clearly based on a certain personal experience of Chan awakening. Other Neo-Confucian arguments such as that “the man of humanity forms one body with Heaven， Earth， and the myriad things，” “experiencing the unaroused state of mind，” “the spirit of the mind is called sagehood，” “fostering the incipience in quietness，” and “outside the mind， there is nothing” all can be seen as statements concerning the realm of “seeing the Way” （见道）. No doubt， this experience of “seeing the Way” smacking of “Chan bliss” （禅悦） stimulated those philosophers’ psychological potential， made them firmer in their belief in attaining sagehood， and it even affected the way they saw the original substance of the universe. Contemporary Chinese scholar Chen Lai 陈来 has noted： Whether from the viewpoint of logic or history， without the full development of Chan Buddhism in the Tang and Song dynasties . . . if Chan had not brought about the atmosphere where the pursuit of going directly to the mind and seeking inward for introspection prevailed， and if Chan Buddhists’ deep probe into the mind for inner life and experience had not attracted scholar-officials so strongly， xinxue as we know it would not have come into being. In this sense， it can be said that without Buddhism， there would not have been Neo-Confucian xinxue.
In traditional Confucianism， all concepts related to original substance such as tian， dao， qi 气 （vital energy）， xing 性 （human nature）， and ming 命 （destiny） occupied important positions， while what characterizes the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind is that it emphasized the homogeneity of all such concepts and gave extreme prominence to the commanding position of the mind. Compared with philosophers of principle such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi， Lu Xiangshan， Yang Jian， and other philosophers of the mind claimed either “the mind is the same as principle” or “the mind is the same as the Way，” but seldom touched upon the question of human nature. In their theoretical system， what constituted the ultimate basis for attaining sagehood is the complete and self-contained original mind， and when they spoke of mind this encompassed the idea of human nature， but not vice versa. So to them， speaking of mind was clearer and more straightforward than speaking of human nature.
A Blend of Confucianism and Chan [65]
Furthermore， when conceiving of the mind as the original substance， Song–Ming xinxue was mainly influenced by Buddhist tathāgatagarbha doctrine that whatever exists is ultimately reducible to the “true and eternal mind.” In China tathāgatagarbha is usually called “buddha nature” （佛性）. In addition， it is called many other terms to highlight its different natures， for example as the enlightened mind free from all illusion （觉性）， as the nature of the things （自性）， dharma-nature， the nature underlying all thing （法性）， embodiment of dharma （法身）， nirvana （涅槃）， the eternal， impersonal， unchangeable reality behind all phenomena （真如）， reality （实相）， the region of reality （实际）， and complete enlightenment potentially present in each being （圓觉）. The doctrine of tathāgatagarbha claims that all men are capable of attaining Buddhahood， a notion that tallies conceptually with the Confucian proposition that “all men may be Yao and Shun，” and later it developed into the dominant doctrine of Buddhism in Chinese tradition. Of the major sects of Chinese Buddhism， the Huayan， Tiantai， and Chan schools all were founded on the basis of the doctrine. The establishment of the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha had to do with the ancient Indian tradition of meditation which aimed to purify body and mind. The doctrine was based on the experience of meditative introspection， so it could not be cognized by the usual perception through using the senses of seeing and hearing. This is quite different from the humanistic tradition advocated by traditional Confucianism on the basis of an education mediated by rites and music， for the latter is in essence a humanistic tradition oriented toward this life and experiential reason. Though Mencius’s propositions that “all things are already complete in me” and that human nature is good show a formal similarity with the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha， as explained earlier， Mencius’s idea of regarding human nature as the a priori basis for human moral practice still came from the moral consciousness that originated from human relationship rather than from the experience of “seeing nature” through the Chan meditation. Later， the xinxue philosophers absorbed unconsciously the Chan doctrine of tathāgatagarbha and its approach to self-cultivation and integrated its notion of a “self-existent pure mind” with Mencius’s “original mind with intuitive knowledge，” thus tinting Mencius’s theory of the mind and nature with a heavy color of Chan. For example， Yang Jian thought that Confucius’s proposition that the spirit of the mind was called sagehood was identical conceptually with Bodhidharma’s saying that what all the Buddhas instructed could only be transmitted from mind to mind and the mind was the very Buddhahood. Wang Yangming was also of the opinion that the “true face” spoken of by Chan was the very intuitive knowledge taught about in Confucianism. The “original mind” or “intuitive knowledge” as mentioned by them， though pointing functionally to the Confucian practice of filial piety， fraternal duty， and feeling of commiseration， is in essence not different from the tathāgatagarbha notion of the intrinsically pure mind.
In this point， Mou Zongsan argued that the original mind as conceived by Lu–Wang xinxue corresponded formally to the “true and eternal mind” and represented both the backbone of pre-Qin Confucianism and also a manifestation of the Mencian spirit in Chinese Buddhist thought. By borrowing the Buddhist term “true and eternal mind，” Mou purposed to highlight the absolute universality， infinity， and creativity of the “original mind” put forth by Confucius and Mencius. This indicates that Mou’s interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s concept of the mind of humanity by using the Buddhist concept of the true and eternal mind put him from what Confucius and Mencius actually meant to say. In truth， Mencius located people’s a priori intuitive knowledge and innate goodness in the mind and， by making efforts to cultivate oneself by “seeking the lost mind” and “understanding words and nourish the vast， flowing vital energy in oneself” （Mencius 2A：2）， revealed the moral potential of humankind and liberated it from the confinement of human desires. Mencius advocated building a firm， upright moral personality through these methods， aiming to realize his ideal that the country should be ruled according to the ideal of the “kingly Way” （王道）. However， Mou Zongsan’s argument that the functioning of the mind of humaneness and innate goodness （仁心善性） points to the existence of an “intellectual intuition” （智的直覺） that exercises cosmological creativity results clearly from the Chan proposition that “no matter when， the self-nature is able to generate the myriad dharmas.” Of course， the turn from Heaven toward mind as the original substance manifested itself to different degrees in different xinxue philosophers. None could accept the Buddhist doctrine which regarded everything in the universe as being empty and illusory. From this， it is clear that when Neo-Confucian xinxue thinkers theorized about the mind in its capacity as the original substance， they did so less to craft an ontology and more in pursuit of a theory of realms of spiritual attainment （境界）. This was far from the Buddhist absolute philosophical idealism which claimed that “the myriad dharmas are made from the mind alone.” Though here we have discussed the Neo-Confucian turn to the mind as the original substance in response to Chan， we do not mean that Neo-Confucian xinxue was really crypto-Buddhist. Despite Chan’s emphasis on practicing self-cultivation according the Buddhist doctrine in the world of sentient beings， which is typical of Sinicized forms of Buddhism， Chan still kept the Buddhist “Three Seals of the Dharma” （三法印）iii as its standard. So in its fundamental spirit， it pursued detachment from world through living in the world， which is essentially different from the strongly humanist Confucian concern with this life.
Pros and Cons of the Neo-Confucian Turn to Mind [67]
The Song–Ming xinxue concept of “original mind” is different from either Mencius’s concept of “original mind” or the Chan doctrine of tathāgatagarbha but blends both. And as far as the overall development of Confucianism goes， this inward turn represented their outstanding theoretical contribution but at the same time led to some abuses.
First， it carried forward the subjective self-containment of the mind and weakened the Confucian sense of the objective reality of Heaven and Earth. In traditional Confucianism， Heaven was not only the absolutely existent original substance but the source of human value as well. Neo-Confucian xinxue emphasized the original mind’s properties such as its self-illumination and completeness， seeing the original mind with its intuitive knowledge as the true basis for value， while relegating Heaven and the Heavenly Way to a secondary position. This fundamental change forefronted the human mind as self-contained and transcendental master， and without doubt this is very significant to building a firm moral personality and elevating spiritual achievement. But unlike traditional Confucianism， which upheld Heaven as the original substance and valued the objectivity of the things of the world， and again unlike Neo-Confucian lixue， which saw Heavenly principle as the original substance and attached importance to reading Confucian classics and exploring principle to the utmost， what the xinxue philosophers paid attention to was the purely good motivation and completeness of the mind as the substance， thus slighting empirical knowledge， traditionally called the “knowledge from seeing and hearing.” Thus to some extent it turned the external way advocated by traditional Confucianism into an internal way pursued within the mind. This inclination could by no means lead to any universally applicable public ethics， let alone usher in modern science. Even Mou Zongsan， who utterly adored Neo-Confucian xinxue， admitted its defect in regard to the objective Heavenly Way and， despite its strength in inner sageliness， its weakness in outer kingliness. For this reason he put forth his theory of the “self-negation of intuitive knowledge” （良知自我坎陷） in the hope of introducing modern democracy and science in Confucianism. Second， the xinxue turn toward mind as original subs enhanced the religious character of Confucianism， downgrading its practical and intellectual features. As a worldly doctrine， traditional Confucianism was committed to the grand mission of bringing order to the state and peace to the world， so it could not but be highly and actively concerned with actual politics and the people’s livelihoods， and it could not but set store by the practical reason for providing proper implements for the conveniences of life， securing abundant means of sustenance， opening up the knowledge of worldly things， and accomplishing great undertakings. Due to this general characteristic of Confucianism， it was impossible for it to detach itself from the world as Chan Buddhism did in pursuit of nothing but personal liberation; rather， it had to dedicate itself to making efforts for extensive study of what is good， accurate inquiry and careful reflection on it， clear discrimination of it， and attaching importance to the accumulation and transmission of experiential knowledge.
However， for the xinxue philosophers， the original mind represented the spiritually liberating wisdom which found no equal among worldly things， which inevitably resulted in a devaluing experiential in favor of intuitive experience. On the part of Buddhism and Daoism， both of which pursued liberation from the world， that was not a problem and remained above criticism. However， it would bring about serious consequences to the Confucian pursuit of saving the world and people. As Wei Zhengtong 韋政通 （1927–2018） commented，
Philosophers such as Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming， who believed that there was neither principle nor things outside the mind， wiped out the root and shoot of experiential knowledge most completely. Along their path there would never arise the question of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile， the souls subject to that path would never recognize the value of scientific knowledge.
Strictly speaking， what Lu and Wang believed is only that empirical knowledge had nothing to do with moral cultivation; they did not single-mindedly denigrate it. Nonetheless， compared with pre-Qin Confucianism and even with Zhu Xi’s philosophy， their philosophy displayed an anti-intellectual inclination to emphasize morality and neglect knowledge. This judgement is beyond question.
The fundamental doctrine of Confucianism is nothing other than to fulfill the duty of humanity by virtue of the power of moral feeling and experiential reason. The xinxue philosophers， by highlighting the religious feature of the original mind which underwent neither birth nor death， instilled into their theories the wisdom of settling the problem of life and death. As said by Charles Wei-Hsun Fu： Wang Ji 王畿 （1498–1583， style name Longxi 龙溪）， Wang Yangming’s disciple， rendered his teacher’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge closer and closer to the doctrine of Chan and used intuitive knowledge， that is， the mind and nature and their recognition which broke completely the opposition between life and death， to define the purports of Confucianism， Buddhism， and Daoism. In fact， it can be said justifiably that， in the philosophy of the mind advocated by Yangming and Longxi， the moral idealism of Confucianism was deepened， on the basis of the mind and nature recognition （above the secular morality）， toward a life and death philosophy， and its supersecular hyper-spirituality or religiousness became the origin or basis for the secular and worldly ethics and morality， but not vice versa.
Third， it highlighted “neither thinking nor acting” （Book of Changes， “Appended Remarks I” [系辞上]）， the high and brilliant side of Confucianism， and de-emphasized “choosing what is good and firmly holding it fast” （Doctrine of the Mean）， its plain and solid side. The concept of mind as the original substance affects directly the Confucian theories of self-cultivation and realms of spiritual attainment. Pre-Qin Confucianism pursued a realm of sagehood beyond an experience of having or exercising any will （無意）. This referred to a level of self-cultivation wherein one transformed one’s physical nature and one’s moral conduct was able to display itself in a way that was no longer conscious but now wholly unconscious. This is exemplified by Confucius’s saying “I could follow what my heart desired， without transgressing what was right” （Analects 2：4）， and Mencius’s idea of “being what one is” （Mencius 7A：30） and “walking along the path of humanity and righteousness， yet not needing to pursue humanity and righteousness” （4B：19）， and by “hitting what is right without effort and apprehending without the exercise of thought” in the Doctrine of the Mean. However， though traditional Confucianism’s exposition of this realm beyond will either described the character of sages or depicted the utmost state of self-cultivation， it never pursued the mind as the substance directly and assiduously.
However， due to Chan influence， the Neo-Confucian xinxue philosophers dissolved step by step the dimensions of deed， achievement， and intelligence contained in traditional Confucian ideas of sagehood. Instead， they saw “neither thinking nor acting” in practicing morality as the realm of sagehood and pursued it one-sidedly as the objective of their self-cultivation. To be frank， it is true that those philosophers’ Chan inspirations represent their great creation， which enhanced greatly the speculative quality and the height and brilliance of Confucianism， and furthermore it enabled their followers to gain the life wisdom and experience of transforming attachment into non-attachment. This was not without benefit to Confucianism in pursuing its loftier political and social ideal. However， the problem is that the Chan approaches to self-cultivation aimed， after all， at religious liberation rather than moral practice. Once the xinxue philosophers applied these ideals of non-attachment to practicing morality， they put their adherents on a path toward dissolving the empirical character of Confucianism， which would further lead to a certain retreat from the world， thus diluting humanistic pursuit of secular achievement and the simple and plain spirit of “choosing what is good and firmly holding fast to it.”
Bibliography of Cited Translations
Legge， James， trans. Analects. http：//ctext.org/analects， accessed May 23， 2020.
——. Mencius. http：//ctext.org/mengzi， accessed May 23， 2020.
Wang， Xiaonong 王晓农 and Zhao Zengtao 赵增韬， trans. Getting to Know Master Zhu： English Translation of Selections from Zhuzi Yulei [《朱子语类》选译]. Beijing： China Social Sciences Press， 2018.
Translated by Wang Xiaonong
Keywords： Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind， xinxue， Heaven as the original substance， mind as the original substance， Chan
Under the strong influence of Chan Buddhism， both the court and the commoners in the Song dynasty （960–1279） were pervaded with an atmosphere for blending Confucianism and Buddhism in pursuit of self-cultivation. This is the cultural and ideological soil where the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind （xinxue 心學） began to germinate. Thanks to a group of Southern Song Neo-Confucians’ efforts， represented by Zhang Jiucheng 张九成 （1092–1159） and Lu Xiangshan 陆象山 （1139–1193， a.k.a. Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊）， xinxue kept on growing day by day into a Neo-Confucian school which stood up as an equal to Cheng Yi 程颐 （1033–1107） and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 （1130–1200） school of principle （lixue 理学）. As the xinxue philosophers gradually converted the concept of Heaven as the original substance in traditional Confucianism into that of mind as the original substance， the Confucian moral original mind， to some extent or in some form， became much closer to the Chan tathāgatagarbha doctrine of the self-existent pure mind.
Heaven as the Original Substance in Traditional Confucianism [Refer to page 60 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]
As its name suggests， xinxue centers on the mind. Within Confucianism before the Northern Song， the concept of Heaven as the original substance had always been absolutely dominant. In that tradition， the character tian 天 had three basic meanings： Heaven as the master （主宰之天）， Heaven as moral nature （德性之天）， and natural heaven （自然之天）. All these referred not only to the total foundation for the generation and transformation of the myriad things but also to the material basis humankind depended on for its subsistence and development， and furthermore to the ultimate source from which the human moral consciousness originated. Of course， usually these three meanings of tian are hardly distinguishable in the texts of Confucian classics. For example， as recorded in the Analects， Confucius said， “Does tian speak？ The four seasons pursue their courses and all things are continually being produced， but does tian say anything？” and “Tian produced the virtue that is in me， but Huan Tui 桓魋， what can he do to me？” （Analects 7：23）. However， no matter whether Confucius said tian in the sense of natural heaven， moral Heaven， or religious Heaven， it does not hamper it from meaning the foundation for the subsistence of the myriad things and the source of human value. If measured by the concept of noumenon in the Western philosophy， among traditional Confucian concepts， perhaps only tian can be regarded as noumenon in the sense. As noted by modern Chinese scholars such as Li Zehou 李澤厚 and Charles Wei-Hsun Fu 傅伟勋 （1933–1996）， Confucianism’s concept of tian with the virtue of production and reproduction of life resulted only from its projection of human emotion， values， and ideas into nature and therefore must be based on the human mind as its precondition. However， this modern interpretation of it in the genetic sense does not conform to the fundamental spirit and cognitive model of traditional Confucianism.
In pre-Qin Confucianism， what was indeed lightly tinted with the idea of mind as the original substance is the thought of Mencius. According to Mencius， the mind was not only a thinking organ with cognitive function， but， more importantly， the moral subject with intuitive knowledge and intuitive capacity， of which he said， “All things are already complete in me. There is no greater delight than being conscious of sincerity on self-examination.” But the question is： how could these outside objective “things” be “complete” in the subjective “me” or “my mind”？ This was also a topic of incessant polemics among later Confucians. In light of Mencius’s theory of human nature， what is more fundamental than the mind is human nature， and this was seen as the transcendental essence innate in humankind， which makes it what it is. What belongs by his nature to the superior man （junzi 君子） cannot be increased by the largeness of his sphere of action， nor diminished by his dwelling in poverty and retirement， for the reason that it is determinately apportioned to him by Heaven. What belongs by his nature to the Superior Man are humanity， righteousness， propriety， and wisdom， which are rooted in his mind. （Mencius 7A：21）
To him， the original mind was the emanation and function of human nature， which represented the experiential reality of moral consciousness. According to Mencius， the original mind， which embraced such positive feelings as the feeling of commiseration and of shame and dislike， was nothing but the beginning of human nature， and his proposition that “all men may be Yaos and Shuns”i （6B：2） was made in regard to human nature rather than to the mind. The Song–Ming xinxue philosophers， influenced by the Chan theory of the mind and human nature， tied its concept of profoundly enlightened mind to Mencius’s concept of the original mind and let the mystic experience gained in contemplation and Mencius’s “all things are already complete in me” verify each other， believing that they had regained the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius which had been lost for over a thousand years. However， in essence， what they did is only a creative interpretation of Mencius’s doctrine of the mind.
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995） opined，
Mencius said that humankind possesses the original mind. This original mind is the same as human nature， and it is the tiny point by which humankind differs from the lower animals. The moral consciousness is very sincere and affable. Mencius manifested the moral consciousness， but he did not reveal completely the absolute universality of original mind.
Mou identified Mencius’s original mind with human nature， but this is open to discussion. When Mencius said， “He who has exerted his mind to the utmost knows his nature. When knowing his nature， he knows Heaven” （Mencius 7A：1）， he noted the very difference between the mind and the human nature and tian in regard to whether there was exertion to the utmost or not. If we， as those Neo-Confucian philosophers of the mind did， equated directly original mind with human nature which was subject to neither increase nor decrease， the original mind would never be lost， and then there would be no such issues as “seeking the lost mind” （6A：11） and “losing one’s original mind” （6A：10）. According to Mou， Mencius’s so-called absolute original mind， actually referred to the transcendental mind as the original substance， that is， the free and infinite mind endowed with intellectual intuition. Obviously Mou subscribed to the Chan-colored understanding held by the Song–Ming xinxue philosophers in his interpreting Mencius. As a matter of fact， under the historical backdrop of pre-Qin Confucianism， the absoluteness of Mencius’s concept of original mind could by no means be revealed completely， since Mencius’s concept of original mind was based on the moral emotion of actual ethics rather than the intuitive knowledge which， as Wang Yangming 王陽明 （1472–1528） claimed， was subject to no distinction between good and evil， found nothing equal to it， and created heaven and earth. In addition， in Mencius’s theory of the mind and nature， there is a more fundamental concept than the mind and nature， namely tian. When Mencius said， “Humanity， righteousness， propriety， and wisdom are not infused into us from without” （6A：6）， he was emphasizing the innateness of human moral consciousness， and clearly here he followed Confucius， who had said “tian produced the virtue that is in me” （Analects 7：23） and agreed with the Doctrine of the Mean which says， “What Heaven has conferred is called the nature.” According to this understanding， Mencius was still a proponent of Heaven as the original substance， rather than of the mind as the original substance. From Heaven to Mind as the Original Substance [62]
Before the Northern Song， Confucianism was based on Heaven as the original substance and had not undergone any fundamental change. However， in Neo-Confucian xinxue， the mind replaced Heaven as the original substance and was taken as the true source of all values in the world and even of the myriad things therein. Generally speaking， the theory of mind as the original substance had to do with a host of Neo-Confucians who “immersed themselves into the theories of various schools of thought， spent several decades studying the doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism， and then emerged and returned to the Six Classicsii， and finally attained accomplishment.”
As a forerunner of the philosophy of the mind， Cheng Hao 程顥 （1032–1085） emphasized mind as master and commander：
Heaven and humankind are originally not two， so there is no need to speaking of combining them.
The mind is the very Heaven; to exert the mind to the utmost is to know human nature， and to know human nature is to know Heaven. Whenever one is， he can realize it and should never turn to the external and seek for it.
Of course， he spoke of Heaven and humankind as one in regard to mind’s capacity for sympathetic connection （感通）， but in his philosophy， the supreme original substance was still Heaven or Heavenly principle， not the mind. His theory was only a little inclined to xinxue. His younger brother Cheng Yi 程颐 （1033–1107）， in his attempt to reject the nothingness preached by Buddhism and Daoism， was more emphatic of the objective reality of Heavenly principle， indicating his inheritance of traditional Confucianism’s concept of Heaven as principle （义理之天）. He said， “Heaven possesses the principle and the sage goes by following it， which is the so called Way （dao 道）. The sage follows Heaven， while Buddhists follow the mind.” Here in a nutshell he made clear the difference between the basic positions of Confucians and Buddhists on original substance. Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi’s disciples， such as Xie Liangzuo 谢良佐 （1050–1103） and Yang Shi 杨时 （1053–1135）， drew on the Chan theory of the mind and nature more or less， but in regard to the interrelation among the mind， nature， Heaven， and principle， they largely continued their teachers’ theory， seeing Heavenly principle as the supreme existence above the myriad things. Hence they did not build a true theory of mind as the original substance.
It is due to the Confucians not long after them， such as Zhang Jiucheng and Lu Xiangshan， that Confucian notions of original substance began to incline from Heaven toward mind in varying degrees. What these figures had in common was that they highlighted the original mind’s completeness and self-containment， void luminance and supreme goodness， and its being subject to neither generation nor extinction. As Zhang said， All the myriad things in the world are born of the mind. . . . As regards its great substance， all Heaven and Earth， yin and yang operate as the variants of the principle within the scope it defines， and as regards the great function， all the work of nature which displays subtle ingenuity occurs with impetus from it.
Lu Xiangshan made many well-known propositions such as “the universe is my mind and my mind is the universe.” Though they did not deny the status of Heavenly principle as the original substance of the universe， when they emphasized that Heavenly principle was born of the mind or the mind was the same as principle， they saw the mind as an existence more fundamental than Heavenly principle. Furthermore， Yang Jian 楊简 （1141–1226） claimed，
Heaven and Earth are my Heaven and Earth， and change and transformation are my change and transformation. None of them are external to me. . . . Heaven is the image in my nature and Earth is the form in my nature， so when the Book of Changes says “in Heaven there is formed the image， and in Earth there is produced the form，” it refers to nothing but me.
Wang Yangming went further and put forth such propositions as “outside the mind， there is neither any principle， nor any thing， nor any affair.” Later， Liu Zongzhou 刘宗周 （1578–1645） said， “The Buddhist doctrine is one of the original mind and the Confucian doctrine is also one of the original mind.” Thus it has to be concluded that in the Song–Ming philosophy of mind， the Confucian theory of original substance underwent some variation.
This change of original substance from Heaven to the mind brought about by xinxue thinkers has obviously to do with some of them drawing on Chan. Mencius’s propositions such as “all things are already complete in me” had been like thousand-year puzzles until these philosophers turned to sitting still in Chan-style meditative introspection to cultivate the mind and nature. Lu Xiangshan’s “the universe is my mind and my mind is the universe” was clearly based on a certain personal experience of Chan awakening. Other Neo-Confucian arguments such as that “the man of humanity forms one body with Heaven， Earth， and the myriad things，” “experiencing the unaroused state of mind，” “the spirit of the mind is called sagehood，” “fostering the incipience in quietness，” and “outside the mind， there is nothing” all can be seen as statements concerning the realm of “seeing the Way” （见道）. No doubt， this experience of “seeing the Way” smacking of “Chan bliss” （禅悦） stimulated those philosophers’ psychological potential， made them firmer in their belief in attaining sagehood， and it even affected the way they saw the original substance of the universe. Contemporary Chinese scholar Chen Lai 陈来 has noted： Whether from the viewpoint of logic or history， without the full development of Chan Buddhism in the Tang and Song dynasties . . . if Chan had not brought about the atmosphere where the pursuit of going directly to the mind and seeking inward for introspection prevailed， and if Chan Buddhists’ deep probe into the mind for inner life and experience had not attracted scholar-officials so strongly， xinxue as we know it would not have come into being. In this sense， it can be said that without Buddhism， there would not have been Neo-Confucian xinxue.
In traditional Confucianism， all concepts related to original substance such as tian， dao， qi 气 （vital energy）， xing 性 （human nature）， and ming 命 （destiny） occupied important positions， while what characterizes the Neo-Confucian philosophy of the mind is that it emphasized the homogeneity of all such concepts and gave extreme prominence to the commanding position of the mind. Compared with philosophers of principle such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi， Lu Xiangshan， Yang Jian， and other philosophers of the mind claimed either “the mind is the same as principle” or “the mind is the same as the Way，” but seldom touched upon the question of human nature. In their theoretical system， what constituted the ultimate basis for attaining sagehood is the complete and self-contained original mind， and when they spoke of mind this encompassed the idea of human nature， but not vice versa. So to them， speaking of mind was clearer and more straightforward than speaking of human nature.
A Blend of Confucianism and Chan [65]
Furthermore， when conceiving of the mind as the original substance， Song–Ming xinxue was mainly influenced by Buddhist tathāgatagarbha doctrine that whatever exists is ultimately reducible to the “true and eternal mind.” In China tathāgatagarbha is usually called “buddha nature” （佛性）. In addition， it is called many other terms to highlight its different natures， for example as the enlightened mind free from all illusion （觉性）， as the nature of the things （自性）， dharma-nature， the nature underlying all thing （法性）， embodiment of dharma （法身）， nirvana （涅槃）， the eternal， impersonal， unchangeable reality behind all phenomena （真如）， reality （实相）， the region of reality （实际）， and complete enlightenment potentially present in each being （圓觉）. The doctrine of tathāgatagarbha claims that all men are capable of attaining Buddhahood， a notion that tallies conceptually with the Confucian proposition that “all men may be Yao and Shun，” and later it developed into the dominant doctrine of Buddhism in Chinese tradition. Of the major sects of Chinese Buddhism， the Huayan， Tiantai， and Chan schools all were founded on the basis of the doctrine. The establishment of the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha had to do with the ancient Indian tradition of meditation which aimed to purify body and mind. The doctrine was based on the experience of meditative introspection， so it could not be cognized by the usual perception through using the senses of seeing and hearing. This is quite different from the humanistic tradition advocated by traditional Confucianism on the basis of an education mediated by rites and music， for the latter is in essence a humanistic tradition oriented toward this life and experiential reason. Though Mencius’s propositions that “all things are already complete in me” and that human nature is good show a formal similarity with the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha， as explained earlier， Mencius’s idea of regarding human nature as the a priori basis for human moral practice still came from the moral consciousness that originated from human relationship rather than from the experience of “seeing nature” through the Chan meditation. Later， the xinxue philosophers absorbed unconsciously the Chan doctrine of tathāgatagarbha and its approach to self-cultivation and integrated its notion of a “self-existent pure mind” with Mencius’s “original mind with intuitive knowledge，” thus tinting Mencius’s theory of the mind and nature with a heavy color of Chan. For example， Yang Jian thought that Confucius’s proposition that the spirit of the mind was called sagehood was identical conceptually with Bodhidharma’s saying that what all the Buddhas instructed could only be transmitted from mind to mind and the mind was the very Buddhahood. Wang Yangming was also of the opinion that the “true face” spoken of by Chan was the very intuitive knowledge taught about in Confucianism. The “original mind” or “intuitive knowledge” as mentioned by them， though pointing functionally to the Confucian practice of filial piety， fraternal duty， and feeling of commiseration， is in essence not different from the tathāgatagarbha notion of the intrinsically pure mind.
In this point， Mou Zongsan argued that the original mind as conceived by Lu–Wang xinxue corresponded formally to the “true and eternal mind” and represented both the backbone of pre-Qin Confucianism and also a manifestation of the Mencian spirit in Chinese Buddhist thought. By borrowing the Buddhist term “true and eternal mind，” Mou purposed to highlight the absolute universality， infinity， and creativity of the “original mind” put forth by Confucius and Mencius. This indicates that Mou’s interpretation of Confucius and Mencius’s concept of the mind of humanity by using the Buddhist concept of the true and eternal mind put him from what Confucius and Mencius actually meant to say. In truth， Mencius located people’s a priori intuitive knowledge and innate goodness in the mind and， by making efforts to cultivate oneself by “seeking the lost mind” and “understanding words and nourish the vast， flowing vital energy in oneself” （Mencius 2A：2）， revealed the moral potential of humankind and liberated it from the confinement of human desires. Mencius advocated building a firm， upright moral personality through these methods， aiming to realize his ideal that the country should be ruled according to the ideal of the “kingly Way” （王道）. However， Mou Zongsan’s argument that the functioning of the mind of humaneness and innate goodness （仁心善性） points to the existence of an “intellectual intuition” （智的直覺） that exercises cosmological creativity results clearly from the Chan proposition that “no matter when， the self-nature is able to generate the myriad dharmas.” Of course， the turn from Heaven toward mind as the original substance manifested itself to different degrees in different xinxue philosophers. None could accept the Buddhist doctrine which regarded everything in the universe as being empty and illusory. From this， it is clear that when Neo-Confucian xinxue thinkers theorized about the mind in its capacity as the original substance， they did so less to craft an ontology and more in pursuit of a theory of realms of spiritual attainment （境界）. This was far from the Buddhist absolute philosophical idealism which claimed that “the myriad dharmas are made from the mind alone.” Though here we have discussed the Neo-Confucian turn to the mind as the original substance in response to Chan， we do not mean that Neo-Confucian xinxue was really crypto-Buddhist. Despite Chan’s emphasis on practicing self-cultivation according the Buddhist doctrine in the world of sentient beings， which is typical of Sinicized forms of Buddhism， Chan still kept the Buddhist “Three Seals of the Dharma” （三法印）iii as its standard. So in its fundamental spirit， it pursued detachment from world through living in the world， which is essentially different from the strongly humanist Confucian concern with this life.
Pros and Cons of the Neo-Confucian Turn to Mind [67]
The Song–Ming xinxue concept of “original mind” is different from either Mencius’s concept of “original mind” or the Chan doctrine of tathāgatagarbha but blends both. And as far as the overall development of Confucianism goes， this inward turn represented their outstanding theoretical contribution but at the same time led to some abuses.
First， it carried forward the subjective self-containment of the mind and weakened the Confucian sense of the objective reality of Heaven and Earth. In traditional Confucianism， Heaven was not only the absolutely existent original substance but the source of human value as well. Neo-Confucian xinxue emphasized the original mind’s properties such as its self-illumination and completeness， seeing the original mind with its intuitive knowledge as the true basis for value， while relegating Heaven and the Heavenly Way to a secondary position. This fundamental change forefronted the human mind as self-contained and transcendental master， and without doubt this is very significant to building a firm moral personality and elevating spiritual achievement. But unlike traditional Confucianism， which upheld Heaven as the original substance and valued the objectivity of the things of the world， and again unlike Neo-Confucian lixue， which saw Heavenly principle as the original substance and attached importance to reading Confucian classics and exploring principle to the utmost， what the xinxue philosophers paid attention to was the purely good motivation and completeness of the mind as the substance， thus slighting empirical knowledge， traditionally called the “knowledge from seeing and hearing.” Thus to some extent it turned the external way advocated by traditional Confucianism into an internal way pursued within the mind. This inclination could by no means lead to any universally applicable public ethics， let alone usher in modern science. Even Mou Zongsan， who utterly adored Neo-Confucian xinxue， admitted its defect in regard to the objective Heavenly Way and， despite its strength in inner sageliness， its weakness in outer kingliness. For this reason he put forth his theory of the “self-negation of intuitive knowledge” （良知自我坎陷） in the hope of introducing modern democracy and science in Confucianism. Second， the xinxue turn toward mind as original subs enhanced the religious character of Confucianism， downgrading its practical and intellectual features. As a worldly doctrine， traditional Confucianism was committed to the grand mission of bringing order to the state and peace to the world， so it could not but be highly and actively concerned with actual politics and the people’s livelihoods， and it could not but set store by the practical reason for providing proper implements for the conveniences of life， securing abundant means of sustenance， opening up the knowledge of worldly things， and accomplishing great undertakings. Due to this general characteristic of Confucianism， it was impossible for it to detach itself from the world as Chan Buddhism did in pursuit of nothing but personal liberation; rather， it had to dedicate itself to making efforts for extensive study of what is good， accurate inquiry and careful reflection on it， clear discrimination of it， and attaching importance to the accumulation and transmission of experiential knowledge.
However， for the xinxue philosophers， the original mind represented the spiritually liberating wisdom which found no equal among worldly things， which inevitably resulted in a devaluing experiential in favor of intuitive experience. On the part of Buddhism and Daoism， both of which pursued liberation from the world， that was not a problem and remained above criticism. However， it would bring about serious consequences to the Confucian pursuit of saving the world and people. As Wei Zhengtong 韋政通 （1927–2018） commented，
Philosophers such as Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming， who believed that there was neither principle nor things outside the mind， wiped out the root and shoot of experiential knowledge most completely. Along their path there would never arise the question of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile， the souls subject to that path would never recognize the value of scientific knowledge.
Strictly speaking， what Lu and Wang believed is only that empirical knowledge had nothing to do with moral cultivation; they did not single-mindedly denigrate it. Nonetheless， compared with pre-Qin Confucianism and even with Zhu Xi’s philosophy， their philosophy displayed an anti-intellectual inclination to emphasize morality and neglect knowledge. This judgement is beyond question.
The fundamental doctrine of Confucianism is nothing other than to fulfill the duty of humanity by virtue of the power of moral feeling and experiential reason. The xinxue philosophers， by highlighting the religious feature of the original mind which underwent neither birth nor death， instilled into their theories the wisdom of settling the problem of life and death. As said by Charles Wei-Hsun Fu： Wang Ji 王畿 （1498–1583， style name Longxi 龙溪）， Wang Yangming’s disciple， rendered his teacher’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge closer and closer to the doctrine of Chan and used intuitive knowledge， that is， the mind and nature and their recognition which broke completely the opposition between life and death， to define the purports of Confucianism， Buddhism， and Daoism. In fact， it can be said justifiably that， in the philosophy of the mind advocated by Yangming and Longxi， the moral idealism of Confucianism was deepened， on the basis of the mind and nature recognition （above the secular morality）， toward a life and death philosophy， and its supersecular hyper-spirituality or religiousness became the origin or basis for the secular and worldly ethics and morality， but not vice versa.
Third， it highlighted “neither thinking nor acting” （Book of Changes， “Appended Remarks I” [系辞上]）， the high and brilliant side of Confucianism， and de-emphasized “choosing what is good and firmly holding it fast” （Doctrine of the Mean）， its plain and solid side. The concept of mind as the original substance affects directly the Confucian theories of self-cultivation and realms of spiritual attainment. Pre-Qin Confucianism pursued a realm of sagehood beyond an experience of having or exercising any will （無意）. This referred to a level of self-cultivation wherein one transformed one’s physical nature and one’s moral conduct was able to display itself in a way that was no longer conscious but now wholly unconscious. This is exemplified by Confucius’s saying “I could follow what my heart desired， without transgressing what was right” （Analects 2：4）， and Mencius’s idea of “being what one is” （Mencius 7A：30） and “walking along the path of humanity and righteousness， yet not needing to pursue humanity and righteousness” （4B：19）， and by “hitting what is right without effort and apprehending without the exercise of thought” in the Doctrine of the Mean. However， though traditional Confucianism’s exposition of this realm beyond will either described the character of sages or depicted the utmost state of self-cultivation， it never pursued the mind as the substance directly and assiduously.
However， due to Chan influence， the Neo-Confucian xinxue philosophers dissolved step by step the dimensions of deed， achievement， and intelligence contained in traditional Confucian ideas of sagehood. Instead， they saw “neither thinking nor acting” in practicing morality as the realm of sagehood and pursued it one-sidedly as the objective of their self-cultivation. To be frank， it is true that those philosophers’ Chan inspirations represent their great creation， which enhanced greatly the speculative quality and the height and brilliance of Confucianism， and furthermore it enabled their followers to gain the life wisdom and experience of transforming attachment into non-attachment. This was not without benefit to Confucianism in pursuing its loftier political and social ideal. However， the problem is that the Chan approaches to self-cultivation aimed， after all， at religious liberation rather than moral practice. Once the xinxue philosophers applied these ideals of non-attachment to practicing morality， they put their adherents on a path toward dissolving the empirical character of Confucianism， which would further lead to a certain retreat from the world， thus diluting humanistic pursuit of secular achievement and the simple and plain spirit of “choosing what is good and firmly holding fast to it.”
Bibliography of Cited Translations
Legge， James， trans. Analects. http：//ctext.org/analects， accessed May 23， 2020.
——. Mencius. http：//ctext.org/mengzi， accessed May 23， 2020.
Wang， Xiaonong 王晓农 and Zhao Zengtao 赵增韬， trans. Getting to Know Master Zhu： English Translation of Selections from Zhuzi Yulei [《朱子语类》选译]. Beijing： China Social Sciences Press， 2018.
Translated by Wang Xiaonong