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文章利用2001~2012年我国31个省级地方政府相关面板数据,构建地方政府土地财政行为决定的随机效应面板模型,分析纵向财政失衡对地方政府土地财政行为的影响。通过格兰杰检验,对纵向财政失衡、土地财政与地方债务危机三者关系进行动态检验发现,分税制下地方政府纵向财政失衡与土地财政收入之间呈现显著正相关关系,即地方财政收支缺口越大,地方政府越有动力采取土地财政行为弥补该缺口;地方债务危机是纵向财政失衡和地方政府土地财政行为综合作用的产物。
Based on the panel data of 31 provincial-level local governments in China from 2001 to 2012, the article builds a random effect panel model determined by the local government’s fiscal behavior of land, and analyzes the impact of the vertical fiscal imbalance on the financial behavior of local governments. By Granger test, the dynamic test of the relationship between vertical fiscal imbalance, land finance and local debt crisis found that there is a significant positive correlation between the vertical fiscal imbalance of local government and land fiscal revenue under the tax sharing system, that is, the local fiscal revenue and expenditure gap The larger the local government is, the more motivated it is to take the financial acts of land to make up for this gap. The local debt crisis is a product of the combined effects of vertical fiscal imbalances and local governments’ financial acts on land.