我要首先指出,实用主义者不想在哲学上区分第一级的、与实在相符的真理和第二级的、作为最好去相信的东西的真理。我认为,这就提出了一个问题:没有哲学,没有柏拉图主义的那种把偶然、约定的真理从比它更多的真理中剔除出去的企图,文化是否还能发展下去。在《实用主义的后果》一书的最后两节中,我回顾了实在论者对实用主义的最近一轮反驳。这个回顾把我们带回到我最初在哲学与哲学之间的区分。实用主义认为不可能超越塞拉斯关于理解事物相关方式的观点。这种观点对近来书生气十足的知识分子来说,就是要理解不同时代、不同文化的所有不同词汇的相关方式。最近人们用直觉这个名称所称呼的那种方法将使我们脱离这类 I would like to point out first that pragmatists do not want to philosophically distinguish the truths of the first and the real, and the second, the truth of what is best to believe. This, in my opinion, raises the question of whether or not culture, without philosophical or platonic attempts to exclude occasional and agreed truth from more truth than it, can still develop. In the last two sections of The Consequences of Pragmatism, I recall the most recent rebuttal of pragmatism by realists. This review brings us back to my original distinction between philosophy and philosophy. Pragmatism is unlikely to surpass Silas’ view of the ways in which things are understood. This view is an understanding of the different ways in which all the different terms in different cultures and times are different for the intellectuals who have become so angry in recent books. The recent approach that people call the name of intuition will take us out of this category