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长期以来,以经济增长为主要考核指标的官员激励机制使得沿海地方政府在大力发展本地经济的同时却忽视了海洋环境陆源污染治理的重任。在此背景下,通过多项logistic回归模型,对沿海地区地方官员晋升情况与地方经济发展水平、环境污染治理投入、陆源污染治理投入及其治理成效进行相关性检验,发现地方经济发展水平及环境污染治理投入与沿海地方官员的晋升存在显著的相关性,而海洋陆源污染治理投入及治理成效与其晋升不存在显著相关性。从政治晋升激励的视角来看,造成此种结果主要有晋升激励主体褊狭、缺乏实现治污激励目标的专项投入及官员的有限任期制度导致治污过程中的短视行为等方面的原因。而实行晋升考核多元化、增加中央对地方的海洋陆源污染治理投入、晋升考核中纳入海洋陆源污染治理指标、完善环境责任追溯机制是矫治这一问题的有效途径。
For a long time, the incentive mechanism of officials with economic growth as the main assessment index has led coastal local governments to neglect the important task of land-based pollution control in the marine environment while vigorously developing the local economy. In this context, through multiple logistic regression models, the correlation between the promotion of local officials in coastal areas and the level of local economic development, investment in environmental pollution control, input of land-based pollution control and its governance results was tested and found that the level of local economic development and the environment There was a significant correlation between investment in pollution control and the promotion of officials in coastal areas. However, there was no significant correlation between the investment in land-based pollution control and the improvement of marine management. From the perspective of political promotion incentives, the reasons for this kind of outcome are mainly the narrow promotion of incentive bodies, the lack of specific investment to achieve the goal of pollution control and incentives, and the limited term system of officials leading to short-sighted behavior in the process of pollution control. However, it is an effective way to promote the diversification of assessment, increase the central government’s investment in local marine land-source pollution control, incorporate indicators of marine terrestrial pollution control in promotion assessment, and improve the traceability mechanism of environmental responsibility.