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森林保险具有准公共物品性质。目前财政补贴政策在森林保险中遇到的问题来自于政府与保险公司之间的信息不对称,从而导致补贴政策的低效率。文章从信息经济学角度通过建立斯坦科尔博格(stackbarg)博奕模型,论证不对称信息环境下政府对保险公司经营森林保险的财政补贴的效率损失及保险公司策略性反应。由此认为,政府应改进与保险公司之间的关系,积极取信于保险公司,使企业充分认识到财政政策具有长期的执行效力与可信度,从而使保险公司意识到努力增加森林保险供给才是其真正利益所在。
Forest insurance has the nature of quasi-public goods. At present, the problem of financial subsidy policy encountered in forest insurance comes from the asymmetric information between government and insurance companies, which leads to the inefficiency of subsidy policy. From the point of view of information economics, this paper establishes a stackbarg game model to demonstrate the efficiency loss of government subsidies for insurance companies in forest insurance and the strategic response of insurance companies in the asymmetric information environment. Therefore, the government should improve the relationship with insurance companies and win the trust of insurance companies, so that enterprises can fully realize the long-term effectiveness and credibility of fiscal policies, so that insurance companies are aware of their efforts to increase the supply of forest insurance. It is the real interest.