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本文以中组部2013年18号文件颁布为契机,分析了不同控股权性质的上市公司中,具有政府官员背景的独立董事(以下简称官员独董)及其辞职对上市公司股票价值的影响。本文以312家涉及独董辞职的公司为样本,发现与国有控股上市公司相比,聘请官员独董的民营控股上市公司(1)支付的现金股利水平更高;(2)官员独董辞职后股票价值下降的幅度更大。本文的研究结果表明,上市公司通过聘用官员独董获得政治资源,而官员独董同时也会要求上市公司积极响应政府发展资本市场的要求,间接地保护中小股东的利益。
Based on the promulgation of document No. 18 of 2013 by the Central Organization Department, this article analyzes the influence of independent directors (hereinafter referred to as independent directors) and their resignation on the listed company’s stock value among the listed companies with different controlling ownership. This paper, based on a sample of 312 companies involved in the resignation of independent directors, found that compared with the state-controlled listed companies, privately controlled listed companies (1) employing independent directors of the government paid a higher level of cash dividends; (2) The value of the stock dropped even more. The results of this study show that listed companies obtain political resources through hiring officials and independent directors, while officials and independent directors also require listed companies to respond positively to the requirements of the government to develop the capital market and indirectly protect the interests of minority shareholders.