自然人的权利能力不是民法中的一个必要概念,也不是法律主体必须具备的逻辑要素。康德的权利哲学不包含权利能力的逻辑假设;借助奥斯丁的日常语言哲学,权利能力的“资格论”解释进路也无法证明其必要性。另一方面,在“人人平等”或者“机会平等”中,权利能力也不足以占据必要的位置。 The ability of natural persons is not a necessary concept in civil law, nor is it a logical element that legal subjects must possess. Kant’s philosophy of rights does not contain the logical hypothesis of the ability of rights; it can not prove its necessity through Austen’s daily language philosophy and his explanation of the “qualification theory” of the ability to power. On the other hand, in “equality for all” or “equality of opportunity,” power is not enough to occupy the necessary position.