本文以契约理论为基础研究了信息透明度对信贷契约以及不同期限信贷契约治理效应的影响。研究发现,信贷契约和不同期限的契约都能够抑制管理者在职消费的代理成本,长期贷款契约的抑制作用更大。在提高公司绩效方面,信贷契约和短期信贷契约都显著降低公司绩效,长期信贷契约能够显著提高公司绩效。信息透明度能够改善信贷契约的治理效应:信息透明度能够降低信贷契约和短期信贷契约对公司绩效的侵蚀作用,信息透明度能够显著增加信贷契约和长期信贷契约对管理者在职消费的抑制作用。 Based on contract theory, this paper studies the influence of information transparency on the credit contract and the credit contract governance effect of different maturities. The study finds that both the contract of credit and the contracts of different durations can restrain the agency costs of managers’ on-the-job consumption, and the repression of long-term loan contracts is more effective. Credit contracts and short-term credit lending significantly reduce corporate performance in improving corporate performance, and long-term credit lending can significantly improve corporate performance. Information transparency can improve the governance effect of credit contract: information transparency can reduce the corrosive effect of credit contract and short-term credit contract on company performance, and information transparency can significantly increase the inhibitory effect of credit contract and long-term credit contract on in-service consumption of managers.