利率(国家间的利差)如果上升,债务就会依据经济基本面的情况,自发产生滚雪球效应。这是市场的一个不完美之处,因为我们不能确保市场自身会远离“差的”均衡而达到“好的”均衡。我们提出了一个政策干预机制来解决国际间资本流动的结构性弱点。这个政策干预机制的基础是一个简单的分类,它把危机的根源分为三种:信心(利差和货币危机)、基本面(实际增长率)和经济政策(初始赤字)。然后,从理论上提出了“第一贷款人”(lender of first resort,以下简称LFR)适用的一些环境。本文提出的政策机制希望通过IMF的一些支持来增强事前激励,从而化解避免危机。本文还介绍了“集体行动条款”(collective action clauses---CACs)在减少自我实现性债务危机(self-fullfilling debtcrises,文中有时也翻译为自发性债务危机)中的潜在作用。 Interest rates (spreads between countries) If rising, the debt will be based on the economic fundamentals, spontaneous snowball effect. This is an imperfect market because we can not ensure that markets themselves will achieve a “good” balance away from the “bad” equilibrium. We propose a policy intervention mechanism to address the structural weaknesses in international capital flows. The policy intervention mechanism is based on a simple classification that divides the root causes of crises into three types: confidence (spreads and currency crises), fundamentals (real growth rates), and economic policies (initial deficits). Then, theoretically put forward the “lender of first resort” (hereinafter referred to as LFR) for some of the environment. The policy mechanism proposed in this paper hopes to excuse the crisis by strengthening the ex-ante incentives through some IMF support. The paper also describes the potential role of “collective action clauses” (CACs) in reducing self-fulfilling debt crises (sometimes translated as spontaneous debt crises).