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本文用图形来分析,如果大规模的私有化没有对财产剥离进行限制,就不会导致对法治的需求。中心思想是,个人的经济行为(创造价值或剥夺财产)和其政治立场是相互依赖的。大规模的私有化会使个人非常关心:什么是他们能迅速占有的,而不是等待准许那些能使他们创造更多重要价值的产权保护制度的建立。财产剥夺使这些人致力于延长法治的缺失状态,以至于他们可以享用剥夺的果实而不受政府强制实施产权保护的约束。当每个人试图影响社会选择时,总是关注这种选择对他自己的影响而不是对他人的影响。个人在选择经济行为时忽略了他们的经济决定对以下情况的影响,即他们自己如何投票,其他人认为体制怎样演进,以及他人怎样投资和投票。因此,个人行为的两种扭曲是和选举的公共品性质相关。功利主义的立场(这一立场认为,如果法治有利于某一群体,那么它的政治支持者将会不断地的涌现。)有误导作用,因为这种观点是从政治环境造成的影响中抽象出来的。我们运用这一框架来导出一个更进一步的观点。由于个人经济决策和政治决策之间的相互依赖性,无论是对法治的需求和还是压制,都不能和宏观经济政策分割开来。一个过于紧缩的宏观经济政策会降低和财产剥离有关的价值创造的收益,因而削弱了对法治的均衡需求。宏观经济政策和制度演化不是相互独立的问题。
This article uses a graphical analysis to show that if large-scale privatization does not limit the divestiture of property, it will not lead to the need for the rule of law. The central idea is that individual economic behavior (creating value or depriving property) and its political position are interdependent. Massive privatization can make individuals very concerned about what they can occupy quickly rather than waiting for the establishment of a system of property rights that will allow them to create more important value. Property deprivation has made these people committed to extending the absence of the rule of law so that they can enjoy the fruits of deprivation without being bound by the government’s enforcement of property rights. When each tries to influence social choices, he is always concerned with the impact of such choices on himself rather than on others. Individuals who choose economic behavior ignore the impact of their economic decisions on how they vote themselves, how others think the system evolves, and how others invest and vote. Therefore, the two distortions of personal conduct are related to the nature of the public goods in the election. Utilitarianist positions (This position argues that if the rule of law favors a certain group, its political supporters will continue to emerge.) Misleading as this view is abstracted from the effects of the political environment of. We use this framework to derive a further perspective. Due to the interdependence between individual economic decision-making and political decision-making, the demand and suppression of the rule of law can not be separated from macroeconomic policies. An over-tightening macroeconomic policy will reduce the value-creation benefits associated with the divestiture of property and thus undermine the need for a balanced administration of the rule of law. Macroeconomic policies and institutional evolution are not mutually independent issues.