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This paper constructs and defends Confucian value realism against the challenge of moral skepticism by J.L.Mackie.Mackies challenge is to argue that there is no objectivity in values and values do not exist as part of the fabric of the world.Values are either subjective or are derived from social conventions.This paper contrasts Confucian value realism with contemporary leading value realists in the camp of the Fitting Attitudes theories of value.The contention between the two positions is whether values are ultimately"response-dependent."On the FA theoristsview,values are dependent on human responses,and objectivity boils down to intersubjectivity.On the Confucian view,on the other hand,values are recognized by humans,but are not dependent on human responses.This paper argues that only Confucian value realism is robust because values are seen as natural facts in the world.