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在考虑新投资机会存在的基础上,构建了跨期投资下的控股股东跨期侵占模型,并分析控股股东跨期减持行为.研究发现,理性控股股东会通过第二期的侵占行为控制最优减持比例.理论模型表明主要影响减持的因素包括控股股东初始持股比例、控股股东属性及外部法律保护力度:初始持股比例高及外部法律保护力度强的地区的上市公司的控股股东的减持水平更高,国有控股上市公司的控股股东不倾向进行减持.经验证据表明,控股股东初始持股比例和控股股东属性会产生影响,而外部法律保护力度的影响则不确定.
On the basis of considering the existence of new investment opportunities, this paper constructs a model of inter-temporal expropriation of controlling shareholders under the intertemporal investment and analyzes the controlling shareholder’s intertemporal reduction behavior. The research shows that the rational controlling shareholders’ Superior reduction ratio.The theoretical model shows that the main factors affecting the reduction include the controlling shareholder’s initial holding proportion, the controlling shareholder’s property and the protection of external law: the controlling shareholder of the listed company in the region with a high initial holding percentage and strong external legal protection The controlling shareholders of the state-controlled listed companies do not tend to reduce their holdings.Experience in the evidence shows that the initial controlling shareholders ’shareholdings and the controlling shareholders’ attributes will have an impact, while the impact of external legal protection is not certain.