论文部分内容阅读
基于中国A股上市公司2008~2015年的财务数据,采用双边随机前沿模型探讨政府在税收征收与企业在税收规避中的议价能力。研究得出:政府和企业有不同的税收议价能力,企业在税负规避中处于强势地位。政府平均倾向以25.72%提高企业在“合理税率”基础上的实际税率,而企业平均倾向以39.47%降低自身实际税率,企业最终需要缴纳的实际税率低于“合理税率”达13.75%;相对于民营企业,国有企业显示出更强的税收规避能力,国有企业与政府税负议价的“净效应”使其最终需要缴纳的实际税率低于“合理税率”达16.22%;税收规避能力存在行业个体效应,其中农林行业的税负规避能力最强,而房地产行业的税收规避能力最弱。因此,需进一步完善税法,并强化对国有企业的税收稽查。
Based on the financial data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015, this paper uses the bilateral stochastic frontier model to explore the government’s bargaining power in tax collection and tax avoidance. The research shows that the government and enterprises have different tax bargaining power, and the enterprises are in a strong position in tax avoidance. The average government tended to raise the effective tax rate based on “reasonable tax rate ” by 25.72%, while the average tenant lowered its actual tax rate by 39.47%. The actual tax rate ultimately required to be paid by the enterprise was lower than the “reasonable tax rate” to 13.75 %; Compared with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises showed a stronger ability to evade taxes, and the “net effect” of bargaining state-owned enterprises and government taxes made the final effective tax rate be lower than the “reasonable tax rate” to 16.22 %; Tax avoidance ability exists in the industry individual effect, of which the tax burden of agriculture and forestry industry has the strongest evasion ability, while the real estate industry has the weakest tax evasion ability. Therefore, it is necessary to further improve the tax law and strengthen the tax auditing of state-owned enterprises.