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在城市道路拥挤收费条件下研究出行者出行路径的选择,为政府管理部门提供相关参考。将驾车者划分为高时间价值者和低时间价值者,且居住地和工作地间存在一个包含直达和绕行道路的最简单网络,直达道路在早晚高峰期将征收拥挤费。采用演化博弈的思想,建立了出行者路径选择的效益矩阵,根据雅克比矩阵分析了演化博弈过程的稳定状态,并根据参数的不同分5种情况进行了相应的讨论,最后以算例验证了理论模型的适用性。结果表明,在不征收拥挤费和拥挤费较低时,若拥挤损失大于绕行损失,高、低时间价值者将分别选择直达和绕行道路,反之均倾向于选择直达道路;而在拥挤费较高的情况下,低时间价值者倾向选择绕行以规避直接出行成本的增加,高时间价值者将依然选择直达道路。
Under the conditions of congestion in urban roads, it studies the choice of travel routes and provides reference for government departments. Dividing motorists into high-time valuers and low-time valuers, with the simplest network of direct and detour roads between residence and workplaces, will lead to congestion charges in the morning and evening rush hours. The evolutionary game theory is used to establish the benefit matrix of the route choice of the traveler. The steady state of the evolutionary game process is analyzed according to the Jacobi ratio matrix. According to the different parameters, five cases are discussed. Finally, Applicability of theoretical models. The results show that when the congestion charge and congestion charge are not high, if the congestion loss is greater than the bypass loss, the high and low time-value people will choose to direct and detour the road respectively, otherwise they all prefer to direct the road; In the higher case, low time-value people tend to choose to bypass to avoid the increase in direct travel costs, high time value will still choose to direct the road.