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从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。
Based on the theoretical demand of weaponry procurement, this paper analyzes the problem of production cost control in the process of procurement of weaponry and equipment by using game theory as a theoretical tool. The model of production cost control based on incentive is established, and the characteristics of cost control model Analysis and explanation. In view of the two types of mistakes that the military may have in the process of incentive contract implementation, the cost control model is optimized. Under the condition of asymmetric information, the optimized cost control model can not only effectively reduce the occurrence of two kinds of errors, but also increase the military equipment procurement utility and reduce the agency contractual risk.