为降低委托者与代理者之间的代理成本,建立经理人薪酬与企业业绩相挂钩的业绩型薪酬是一种切实可行的激励手段,但其前提是企业业绩能够反映经理人的经营能力和努力程度。当大股东掏空上市公司,对上市公司的经营业绩和经营状况产生负面影响,甚至造成公司业绩恶化时,这势必影响到以业绩为基础的经理人薪酬。因此,经理人将就其自身的业绩薪酬激励体系与大股东和董事会进行谈判,以求降低其业绩薪酬的激励强度。本文基于2002—2009年上市公司数据,实证检验了作为大股东掏空手段之一的资金占用确实降低了经理人的业绩薪酬激励强度,并且实际控制人性质影响该激励强度。本文为研究两类代理成本的相互影响以及两类代理成本共同影响其他财务行为提供了一种尝试。 In order to reduce the agency costs between the commissioner and the agent, establishing a performance-based compensation that is linked to the performance of the manager’s remuneration is a practical and feasible incentive, but the premise is that the performance of the company can reflect the management ability and efforts of the manager. degree. When a major shareholder shorts a listed company and has a negative impact on the operating performance and operating conditions of the listed company and even results in a deterioration of the company’s performance, this will inevitably affect the performance-based compensation of managers. Therefore, managers will negotiate with their major shareholders and the board of directors regarding their own performance incentive compensation system in order to reduce the incentive intensity of their performance compensation. Based on the listed company’s data from 2002 to 2009, this paper empirically tests that the capital occupation as one of the major shareholder short-selling methods does reduce the manager’s performance pay incentive intensity, and the nature of the actual controller affects the incentive intensity. This paper provides an attempt to study the mutual influence of two types of agency costs and the two types of agency costs that affect other financial behaviors together.