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中国金融体系的脆弱性来自于政府配置资源权力过大所导致的严重的道德风险和大量的或有债务。在经济转轨期,地方政府和国有经济部门掌控着大量驱动经济增长所必须的要素,如土地,矿权,税收,市场准入,环保标准等。因此微观投资回报率可以被轻易改变,使得原来不可行的项目变得可行,信贷和投资得以按照权力的意志而配置。故此,中央银行的货币政策很难保持应有的有效性和独立性。
The fragility of China’s financial system stems from the serious moral hazard and large contingent liabilities caused by the over-allocation of resources by the government. In the period of economic transition, local governments and state-owned economic sectors control a large number of necessary elements that drive economic growth such as land, tenements, taxes, market access and environmental standards. As a result, the micro-rate of return on investment can be easily changed, making otherwise unfeasible projects viable, and credit and investment allocated in the will to power. Therefore, the central bank’s monetary policy is difficult to maintain its due validity and independence.