论文部分内容阅读
众所周知,现代银行作为一个企业,具有与一般意义上的企业同样的因经营不善或其它原因而导致的破产倒闭的可能性,尤其是在金融危机频发的当代。那么,当银行破产倒闭时,储户或者说存款人的存款由谁来负责赔偿就成为一个问题。如果这个问题解决不好,极有可能引发社会的不稳定。基于上述考虑,存款保险制度应运而生,在一定程度上,存款保险制度不仅保护了存款人的利益,而且维护了金融体系乃至整个社会的稳定。但任何制度在实际运行中都无一例外地表现出两重性。存款保险制度也不例外。从实际运行情况来看,其存在着很大的缺陷,其中尤以各方的道德风险行为最为突出。基于此,本文着眼于存款保险制度下的道德风险问题,主要分三部分,第一部分是一个简单的引言;第二部分分别从存款人和投保银行的角度对其进行分析;第三部分在分析的基础上,提出防范道德风险的几个措施,以供参考;最后,对全文进行简要总结。
It is well-known that modern banks as a business have the same possibility of bankruptcy and bankruptcy due to poor management or other reasons as the average business, especially in the current era of frequent financial crisis. So, when a bank goes bankrupt, it becomes a problem for the depositor or depositor who is responsible for making the deposit. If this problem is not solved well, it is highly likely to trigger social instability. Based on the above considerations, the deposit insurance system came into being. To a certain extent, the deposit insurance system not only protects the depositors’ interests, but also maintains the stability of the financial system and the society as a whole. However, any system has shown its duality in actual operation. Deposit insurance system is no exception. Judging from the actual operation, there is a big flaw in it, of which the moral hazard behavior of all parties is the most prominent. Based on this, this article focuses on the issue of moral hazard under the deposit insurance system, mainly divided into three parts, the first part is a simple introduction; the second part analyzes the depositor and the insured bank respectively; the third part analyzes Based on the proposed measures to prevent moral hazard for reference; Finally, a summary of the full text.