一个关于宗教语言的规范性论题的讨论试图表明,对于本体论证明的一种内涵式的弱解读,可以回应K-H(Kaufman-Hick)论题:因为上帝(假设其存在)是无限的,超越的,所以我们不能用任何语言思考中的概念描述他或指称他,即不能把握他。究其本义,K-H论题的核心观点为:任何上帝—谓词即使有内涵,其外延也是空的。在关于这一问题的探讨中,普兰丁格的当代证明,可以看作自安瑟伦以来的各种本体论证明版本的综合,既保存了其关键前提与结论,又避免了其中的各种困难。普兰丁格证明的弱版本:第一,定义了一个普通的上帝—谓词G;第二,仅由某种模态逻辑得到结论:如果G有内涵,则G的外延非空。这个结论,直接反驳了K-H论题,在一种较强的意义上提供了一个成功的反例。 A discussion of normative discourse on religious tongues attempts to show that a connotative weak reading of ontological proof can respond to the KH (Kaufman-Hick) thesis: for God (assuming its existence) is infinite, transcendental, So we can not describe him or condemn him in any linguistic conception, that we can not grasp him. In its original meaning, the key point of K-H’s thesis is that any God-predicate is empty even if it has meaning. In his discussion of this issue, Prandinger’s contemporary proof can be seen as a synthesis of the various ontological proof versions since Anther’s, preserving both its key premises and conclusions and avoiding the various difficult. The weak version of Prandinger’s proof: first, an ordinary God-predicate G is defined; second, the conclusion is reached only by some modal logic: if G has meaning, the extension of G is not null. This conclusion directly refutes the K-H thesis, providing a successful counterexample in a strong sense.