克里普克的通名指称理论试图论证通名是非摹状的,没有涵义的严格指示词,它的指称不是通过摹状词确定的而是由对象的本质特征即内部结构决定的,并经一根历史的因果链条传递下去。克里普克将自然种类通名与心理类型通名区分开,认为自然种类通名的同一性命题必然为真,而对心身同一性表示怀疑并持有一种新二元论立场。与传统观点不同,克里普克发现自然种类通名的同一命题是后验必然真而不是先验必然真,他的论证是通过其可能世界模态逻辑实现的。克里普克的本质主义哲学运思无疑是亚里士多德形而上学的语言重建。无论是心理类型通名还是自然种类通名,都能通过对同一性的辨证分析给出更合理的解释。 Kripke’s theory of generic reference attempts to demonstrate that there are no strict descriptions of the generic name and non-description, the allegation is not determined by the description of the description but by the intrinsic structure of the object, that is, the internal structure. A historical causal chain is passed on. Kripke distinguishes the generic category of generic nature from the mental category, believing that the universal proposition of identity of natural categories must be true, doubts psychosomatic identity and holds a new dualism. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Kripke finds that the common proposition of the natural category is posteriori necessity rather than a priori necessity, and his argument is achieved through its possible world modal logic. Kripke’s philosophy of essentialist philosophy is undoubtedly the language reconstruction of Aristotelian metaphysics. Whether it is psychic type generic name or generic generic name, a more reasonable explanation can be given through the dialectical analysis of identity.