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为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中,与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题,以创意的特性为基础,通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型,证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性,并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现,当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时,分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。
In order to formalize the signal display problem faced by an informant principal during the process of creative transformation and contract with the agent, this paper establishes a Stackelberg signal game model based on the characteristics of the creative, and proves that the creative conversion contract is balanced Existence, and analyzed the impact of intellectual property protection intensity and industrial maturity on the equilibrium contract. The study also found that when there is both the adverse selection of principal and the moral hazard of agent, the separation of equilibrium contract makes the level of agent’s efforts distorted downward.