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现代企业实际上是一系列委托代理关系的总和。而在委托代理关系中,由于委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称,利益不相同,追求的目标不一致,容易导致“道德风险”。为了防止和克服代理人的道德风险,必须设计一个有效的激励约束机制。一方面用激励来缩小委托人与代理人之间的利益差异;另一方面用约束来规范代理人的行为,使其行为不至于偏离正轨。本文从报酬激励、声誉激励、工作激励、市场竞争约束激励四个方面探讨了我国企业经营者的激励机制问题。
The modern enterprise is actually the sum of a series of principal-agent relationships. In the relationship between principal and agent, due to the asymmetric information between the principal and the agent, the different interests and the inconsistent pursuit of the target, it is easy to lead to “moral hazard ”. In order to prevent and overcome the moral hazard of agents, it is necessary to design an effective incentive and restraint mechanism. On the one hand, motivation is used to reduce the difference of interest between the principal and the agent; on the other hand, the constraint is used to regulate the behavior of the agent so that his behavior is not deviated from the right track. This paper probes into the incentive mechanism of business managers in China from four aspects: reward incentive, reputation incentive, work incentive and market competition constraint incentive.