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为给水电工程施工安全目标考核方案决策提供理论支持,通过分析我国水电工程施工安全生产奖惩约束机制,针对奖励、惩罚等激励变量实施的同步性,归纳总结奖励惩罚同步实施、仅实施惩罚、仅实施奖励3种水电工程施工安全目标考核方案。基于“经济人”属性,计算业主和承包商的期望效益函数,分别建立3种情形下的决策模型,利用激励约束、参与约束等约束条件求解Stackelberg博弈均衡,最后对博弈特性进行分析。结果表明,同步实施奖励惩罚的安全目标考核方案是业主的最优方案。最后,通过数值算例验证了该结论。
In order to provide theoretical support for the decision-making of construction safety objectives of hydropower projects, by analyzing the incentive and punishment restraint mechanism of construction safety in hydropower projects in our country, aiming at the synchronization of motivation variables such as reward and punishment, Implementation of three kinds of incentive construction project safety objectives assessment program. Based on the “economic person ” attribute, the expectation benefit function of the owner and the contractor is calculated. The decision models of the three kinds of situations are respectively established. The Stackelberg game equilibrium is solved by constraints such as incentive constraints and participation constraints. Finally, the game characteristics are analyzed. The results show that the safety objective assessment scheme with simultaneous rewards and punishments is the optimal solution for the owners. Finally, this conclusion is verified by a numerical example.