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建立不完全信息下的动态竞购模型,研究基于分手费协议的竞购策略问题。根据序贯博弈理论,首先求解得到竞价阶段并购方的竞价策略;然后,确定序贯进入阶段各参与方的均衡策略,重点比较了有无分手费协议威胁下的竞购均衡和各参与方期望收益;最后,通过数值分析揭示了进入成本对竞购均衡和各参与方期望收益的影响。研究表明,分手费协议威胁将提高并购方1抢占报价时的最低企业估值和抢占价格,增加并购方2进入竞购的概率,并在不阻止并购方1进入并购时提高目标企业和并购方2的期望收益以及总期望收益。然而,分手费协议威胁将减少并购方1的期望收益,从而部分阻止具有正收益的并购的发生。
Establish a dynamic bidding model under incomplete information and study the bidding strategy based on the break-up fee agreement. According to the sequential game theory, the bidding strategy of the bidder’s bidder is first solved. Then, the equilibrium strategy of each participant in the sequential entry phase is determined, and the bidding equilibrium under the threat of the bargaining agreement and the expectation of each participant are compared Finally, the numerical analysis reveals the impact of entry cost on bidding equilibrium and expected return of each participant. The research shows that the threat of break-up fee agreement will raise the minimum enterprise valuation and preemption price when the acquirer 1 seizes the quotation, increases the probability of the acquirer 2 entering the bidding and increases the probability of the target firm and the acquirer not to stop the merger of the acquirer 1 from the merger 2 expected return and total expected return. However, the break-even fee agreement threatens to reduce the expected return on the M & A side, partially preventing any M & A with positive returns.