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本文基于委托代理双方风险规避差异视角,分析了上市公司高管薪酬激励问题,在理论分析的基础上,实证研究发现,高管薪酬与企业绩效的一次方项和二次方项显著正相关,而与企业绩效的三次方项显著负相关,我国上市公司的薪酬激励明显呈现出“S”型的特征,并且存在激励拐点问题:高管人力资源边际报酬递增在一定的绩效区域得到了有效体现,但是边际递减的报酬激励形式发挥了更大的作用。上市公司在对高管进行薪酬激励的过程中,应充分考虑将薪酬激励与风险分担进行有效匹配,严格杜绝高管薪酬呈指数形式飞涨。
Based on the perspective of risk aversion between the principal and the agent, this paper analyzes the executive compensation incentives of listed companies. Based on theoretical analysis, the empirical study finds that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. However, it is significantly negatively related to the third-order items of corporate performance. The salary incentives of listed companies in China are clearly characterized by the “S” type, and there is a problem of incentive inflection points: the increase in the marginal returns of senior management’s human resources has been achieved in certain areas of performance. Effectively embodied, but the marginal diminishing form of reward incentives has played a greater role. In the process of rewarding senior executives, listed companies should fully consider the effective matching of compensation incentives and risk sharing, and strictly prevent executive compensation from soaring in an exponential manner.