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治理水平改善是提高上市公司质量、促进证券市场健康发展的有效途径。本文沿着LLSV模型的研究思路、并在对其进行扩展的基础上,建立恰当的博弈论模型分析证券法的立法导向和投资者诉讼对上市公司治理水平改善的影响,并利用75个国家(地区)的相关数据样本对理论模型的主要结果进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,在立法导向上应确立以投资者诉讼权利保障为核心的理念,强制性信息披露和董事责任对于公司治理水平的改善没有显著作用;对于上市公司治理水平改善而言,法院审判活动的公正性至关重要,诉讼案件持续期限尽管有正向影响,但不具备统计上的显著性,而投资者支付的直接诉讼成本则对上市公司的行为没有显著影响。
Improving governance level is an effective way to improve the quality of listed companies and promote the healthy development of securities market. Based on the research idea of LLSV model and based on the extension of the model, this paper establishes an appropriate game theory model to analyze the legislative direction of securities law and the impact of investor litigation on the improvement of corporate governance in listed companies. By using 75 countries Area) of the relevant data samples of the theoretical model of the main results of an empirical test. The results of the study show that the idea of protecting the rights of investors ’litigation should be established on the basis of legislative guidance. Compulsory information disclosure and directors’ responsibility have no significant effect on the improvement of corporate governance. For the improvement of the governance of listed companies, the court trial activities The fairness of the litigation is of the utmost importance. The litigation duration is not statistically significant despite its positive impact, while the direct litigation cost paid by investors has no significant effect on the behavior of listed companies.