科斯的作品强调非常小规模市场的经济重要性,促使一种新型、更加边际主义形态的经济“制度主义”受到主流经济学的接受。一个科斯市场是一群人的集合,他们对于某种可交易的法律权利拥有相互竞争的主张权。科斯市场和科斯企业的边界均通过测度以下两种成本加以确定:谈判成本,以及在不同地方之间转移资源的绝对成本。科斯市场的边界正如科斯商业企业的边界一样由如下一条线界定,即通过内部交易达成价值最大化之谈判的边际成本正好等于退出到外部的边际成本。关注非常小规模市场是现代交易成本经济学的根本特征。在分析该等市场时,科斯忽视了旧制度主义者采用的兼收并蓄的、历史的和行为主义的进路,采纳了边际分析更高层次的形式主义。然而,在这一过程中,科斯假设忽略了第一代制度主义者试图处理的一些重要事项,并带来了一些新问题,例如与新古典市场相比,科斯市场上是如何实现均衡的。二者之间最重要的区别是,科斯市场要求经过所有参与者的一致同意才能够达成交易——这一条件源于科斯自己提出的相互性要件,他在《社会成本问题》一文中对此作了阐释。均衡问题非常重要,但其意义尚未得到充分研究。因此,有关商业企业的科斯分析比有关法律权利市场的科斯分析取得了更大的进步。另外,当科斯市场的参与者超过两人时,科斯观点中的一个重要特质——私人治理优于立法——丧失了大部分效力。有关公地资源管理的研究大大深化了我们对如下问题的理解,即较大的所有人群体作出的私人资源配置决策何时成功,何时失败。尽管并非所有公地资源市场都属于科斯考察的那种类型,但它们具有很多共同的相关特征。另外,有关公地私人治理安排的经济文献表明,有必要超越科斯经济学之中严格的边际主义方法论,从更广泛的视角考察人类合作的历史、生物及社会动机。 Coase’s work emphasizes the economic importance of very small-scale markets, prompting a new, more marginalist economic “institutionalism” to be accepted by mainstream economics. A Coase market is a collection of people who have competing claims about a tradable legal right. The boundaries between the Kos market and the Kos business are all determined by measuring the cost of negotiation and the absolute cost of moving resources between different locations. The Kosmanian market boundary, just as Coase’s business enterprise borders, is defined by the line that the marginal cost of negotiating to maximize value through internal transactions equals the marginal cost of exit to the outside. Focusing on very small-scale markets is a fundamental feature of modern transaction cost economics. In analyzing these markets, Coase ignores the eclectic, historical, and behavioral approach taken by the old institutionalists and adopts a higher level of formalism in marginal analysis. In the process, however, Coase assumed that some of the important issues that the first generation of institutionalists were trying to ignore were ignored and some new questions were raised, such as how the Kos markets were balanced compared to the neoclassical market. The most important difference between the two is that the Kos market requires the consent of all participants to reach a deal - a condition stemming from Coase’s own interactivity, which he wrote in the article on “Social Costs” Made an explanation. The issue of equilibrium is very important, but its significance has not yet been fully studied. Therefore, the Coase analysis of commercial enterprises has made even greater progress than the Coase analysis on the legal rights market. In addition, as Coase’s market had more than two players, an important characteristic of Coase’s view-private governance over legislation-lost most of its effectiveness. Research on public resources management has greatly deepened our understanding of the question of when and when a larger private-equity decision-making on private resource allocation succeeded. Although not all commons resource markets are of the type examined by Coase, they share many common characteristics. In addition, the economic literature on private governance of commons suggests that it is necessary to go beyond the strict marginalist methodology of Coase economics to examine the historical, biological, and social motivations of human cooperation from a broader perspective.