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合同能源管理是一种新型的节能机制,节能服务需求方与节能服务公司通过合作共享收益。合同能源管理实施的一个难点是节能服务公司(ESCO)的选择,然而,相关研究尚不充分。本文以政府为节能服务需求方,基于多属性逆向拍卖模型研究了ESCO选择问题。ESCO的投标集由三个属性决定,即节能量、项目完成期以及节能收益分享比例。本文通过非合作博弈研究政府和多ESCO间的逆向拍卖行为,将利润分享比例作为能源节省量与项目提前期的函数,我们推导出各ESCO的最优投标策略;在此基础上,每一个ESCO可以通过自身的技术与能力来决定投标策略;于是,在不忽视利润分享的前提下,政府可以依据能源节省量与项目提起期来挑选最优的ESCO。这种ESCO选择机制回避了节能收益分配的谈判,限制了ESCO间的恶意竞争,从而提高了整个合同能源管理过程的运作效率。仿真研究显示,ESCO数量的增加会降低各方的收益,于是,政府有必要限制参与逆向拍卖的ESCO数量。
Contract energy management is a new type of energy-saving mechanism. Energy-saving service demand side and energy-saving service companies share the benefits through cooperation. One of the difficulties in the implementation of contract energy management is the choice of ESCOs, however, the relevant research is not yet sufficient. In this paper, the government as the demand side of energy-saving services, based on the multi-attribute reverse auction model to study the ESCO selection problem. ESCO’s bidding set is governed by three attributes, namely, energy savings, project lead times, and share of energy savings. In this paper, we study the reverse auction behavior between government and multi-ESCO through non-cooperative game, and regard the share of profit sharing as a function of energy saving and project lead time. We deduce the optimal bidding strategies for each ESCO. On this basis, each ESCO Through its own technology and ability to determine the bidding strategy; Thus, without losing sight of profit sharing, the government can select the best ESCO based on energy savings and project lead times. This ESCO selection mechanism avoids the negotiation of energy-saving benefits distribution and limits the hostile competition between ESCOs, thus improving the operational efficiency of the entire contract energy management process. Simulation studies show that an increase in the number of ESCOs will reduce the return on all parties and as a result, it is necessary for the government to limit the number of ESCOs involved in the reverse auction.