布伦塔诺最早将“意向”原则引入现代哲学。现象学两位泰斗胡塞尔与舍勒在意向的奠基结构问题上却针锋相对——持守与反对“表象”的奠基地位。胡塞尔试图从“客体化行为”分析上行到“非客体化行为”分析,并将逻辑理性扩展至实践—价值学领域,其难题是意向性究竟从何处开始上行。舍勒试图从“价值先天”下行到感受行为,其难题是如何能够确保先天价值之在。他们出人意料的一致在于:作为出发点的“实事”是“非意向”的,从而难以纳入现象学直观。 Brentano first introduced the principle of “intention” into modern philosophy. The two phenomenologists, Husserl and Scheler, are diametrically opposed to the foundational structure of their intentions - the founding status of the “appearances” of both conservative and opposition. Husserl tries to analyze the “objectified behavior” to the analysis of “non-objectified behavior” and extend the logical rationality to the field of practice-value science. The challenge is where the intentionality begins to go up. Scheler tried to move from “value of innate” to feeling behavior, the challenge is how to ensure the innate value. Their unexpected agreement is that as a starting point, “fact ” is “non-intention ”, and thus difficult to include phenomenological intuition.