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构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,考察了非合作情形下零售商抗衡势力对制造商产品创新激励的影响。研究结果表明:当零售商抗衡势力较弱时,抗衡势力促进了制造商的产品创新激励,当抗衡势力较强时,买方抗衡势力抑制了上游厂商的产品创新激励;同时,买方抗衡势力增强导致原产品及创新产品的均衡价格下降,均衡产量上升,产品创新程度增强也使两类产品的均衡产量上升。此外,在福利影响方面,买方抗衡势力同时改善了消费者效用和社会总福利。最后,论文证明了买方抗衡势力增强时,中间产品市场“水床效应”是有条件的。
A three-stage dynamic game model is constructed to investigate the impact of retailers ’countervailing forces on manufacturers’ product innovation incentives under non-cooperative conditions. The results show that when the retailer’s countervailing power is weak, the countervailing power promotes the product innovation incentive of the manufacturer. When the countervailing power is strong, the countervailing power of the buyer inhibits the product innovation incentive of the upstream manufacturer. At the same time, the countervailing power of the buyer increases The equilibrium prices of original products and innovative products have dropped, the balanced output has risen, and the enhancement of product innovation has also resulted in an increase in the balanced output of the two products. In addition, in terms of welfare effects, buyers counterbalance their power while improving consumer utility and social welfare. Finally, the paper proves that when the buyer’s countervailing power is enhanced, the intermediate product market “water bed effect ” is conditional.