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本文运用进化博弈理论建立了监察变异条件下的煤矿安全监察机构监察行为进化博弈模型,对监察行为的稳定状态进行了分析。研究表明:监察变异条件下的监察机构监察行为稳定状态主要与监察机构受贿金额、认真执行监察职能获得的激励、不认真执行监察职能节约的成本、上级领导监督概率、不执行监察职能所受处罚相关。最后,对上述参数对稳定点的影响进行了分析。
In this paper, evolutionary game theory is used to establish an evolutionary game model of monitoring behavior of coal mine safety supervision agencies under the condition of monitoring variation, and the steady state of supervision behavior is analyzed. The research shows that: under the condition of monitoring variation, the supervisory behavior of the supervisory organization is mainly related to the amount of bribery received by the supervising agencies, the incentive to conscientiously implement the supervisory functions, the cost of saving the supervisory functions, the probability of supervising the superiors, and the penalty of not implementing the supervisory functions Related. Finally, the influence of the above parameters on the stability point is analyzed.