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本文展示了一个新古典经济学框架内的劳动力迁移自我调节模型。模型的构建基于劳动力迁移流动的动态进化博弈。它假设迁移自我调节的中央机构是劳动力市场并且其均衡解受到等同于工资的迁移力驱动。模型预测出劳动力迁移动态是由工资差别决定的,同时劳动力市场行情和工资水平变化是由劳动力迁移的迁出地和迁入地共同决定。将俄罗斯地区和独联体国家(CIS)的数据应用在模型中,文章分析了俄罗斯劳动力迁移政策自由化的效应。预测出的从CIS到俄罗斯地区的劳动力迁移看上去非常接近真实并且有重要的政策影响。特别是,这些研究发现有利于发展工作许可证的配额。
This article presents a self-regulating model of labor migration within the framework of neoclassical economics. The construction of the model is based on the dynamic evolutionary game of labor mobility. It assumes that the central agency of migration self-regulation is the labor market and its equilibrium solution is driven by the mobility equivalent to wages. The model predicts that the dynamics of labor migration are determined by wage differentials. Meanwhile, changes in labor market quotas and wage levels are determined by the relocation and relocation of labor forces. Applying data from the Russian region and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the model, the article analyzes the effects of the liberalization of labor migration policies in Russia. The projected labor migration from CIS to Russia looks very real and has important policy implications. In particular, these studies found that quotas favorable to the development of work permits.