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提出了供应链一般序贯博弈中旁支付自执行契约(SSEC)设计方法,以解决已有关于旁支付契约供应链协调的研究中未能有效地考虑系统收益增量分配合理性、公平性以及过多强调博弈方自发参与旁支付契约的问题.旁支付自执行契约设计改变了序贯博弈双方的支付函数,使得双方在新条件下的非合作动态博弈中实现了新的子博弈精炼纳什均衡与集中决策全局最优解一致;双方各自收益相对于原动态博弈实现了Pareto改进,双方的最终收益分配不悖于非合作讨价还价博弈的均衡结果.结果表明,在仍然保持供应链分散决策情形下,自执行契约设计使得序贯博弈各方在依靠个人理性(个体利益最优)决策时,取得了的集体理性下的集中决策效果.均衡特性表明自执行契约设计下新博弈决策过程的自执行性、均衡稳定性和帕累托改进性.为了证明SSEC的有效性和实用性,把自执行契约设计方法应用于协调批量契约两级供应链模型、两寡头产量竞争动态博弈和两级供应链定价动态博弈.
Proposed a SSEC design method in the general sequential game of supply chain to solve the problem of the rationality and fairness of the incremental distribution of the system benefits in the existing research on the coordination of the side payment contract supply chain Too much emphasis on the spontaneous participation of the players side pays the contract.The next payment from the implementation of the contract design changes the sequence of the two sides of the game payoff function so that the two sides in the new conditions of non-cooperative dynamic game to achieve a new sub-game refined Nash equilibrium Which is consistent with the global optimal solution of centralized decision-making.Pareto improvement is realized in the respective returns of both parties relative to the original dynamic game, and the ultimate return distribution of both parties is not inconsistent with the equilibrium result of the noncooperative bargaining game.The results show that while still maintaining the decentralized supply chain decision , The self-executing contract design makes the decision-making under the collective rationality made by all parties in the sequential game based on the individual rationality (the best individual interest) .The equilibrium property shows that self-execution of the new game under the contract design Stability, and Pareto improvement.In order to prove the validity and practicability of SSEC, About design method is applied to coordinate two-volume contract supply chain model, two oligarchs yield competitive dynamic game dynamic game and two-stage supply chain pricing.