考虑了由风险中立的单供应商和风险规避的单零售商组成的二级供应链,分别建立了分散决策下和回购契约下供应商占主导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型,求得了均衡解.并研究了零售商下游风险参数值对博弈决策的影响,研究发现当零售商期望目标利润较大时,风险约束下的回购契约机制将无效,且期望目标利润越大则供应商和零售商利润越小,最后用算例对这一结论进行了说明. Consider a two-level supply chain composed of a single-supplier with risk neutrality and a single-retailer with risk aversion, and establish Stackelberg game model under the condition of decentralized decision-making and repurchase contract respectively, and obtain the equilibrium solution. The effect of downstream risk parameters of retailers on game decision-making is studied. The results show that when the retailer’s target profit is large, the repo contract mechanism under risk constraint will be invalid, and the larger the expected profit, the profit of suppliers and retailers The smaller, the final example illustrates this conclusion.