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在欧洲,专业服务规制多年来就是重要的政治议程。本文阐述了欧洲委员会(竞争总理事会)和各个国家的竞争当局为在整个欧盟中推进解除职业规制而采用的工作方法和策略,讨论的核心是规制的公共利益论和私人利益论。本文证明:一方面,欧洲委员会看来是受到了特定成员国中的发展的影响(自下而上效应);另一方面,至少在某些成员国中,近年来有自上而下效应。本文运用欧洲经验,研究中国近来的发展,尤其是律师规制。作者认为,非对称信息论在中国比在欧洲更为重要,而且,由于责任规则还不是良好规制的较好替代(或补充),在中国,规制也有更强的理由。但是,经济理论和欧洲实践说明,一般而言,规制有过度的危险。
In Europe, professional service regulation has been an important political agenda for many years. This article describes the working methods and strategies adopted by the European Commission (Competing General Council) and the competition authorities of various countries to promote the cessation of occupational regulation throughout the European Union. The core of the discussion is the regulated public interest and private interest. This paper proves that on the one hand, the Council of Europe appears to be affected by the development in a given member state (the bottom-up effect); on the other hand, at least in some member countries, there have been top-down effects in recent years. This article uses European experience to study recent developments in China, especially lawyers’ regulation. The author believes that asymmetric information theory is more important in China than in Europe, and because the rules of responsibility are not yet good substitutes (or supplements) for good regulation, there are stronger reasons for regulation in China. However, economic theory and European practice show that in general regulation is overly dangerous.