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本文以构建征纳博弈模型来分析国家与纳税人在个人所得税的征纳博弈中的策略选择。政府在对个人所得税制度的设计和实际征管中要考虑政府的政策选择和纳税人对此的反应和行为选择,纳税人在实行偷漏税行为时会权衡自己所能得到的利益和可能受到的惩罚,双方博弈的结果最终会达到一种均衡,使得征纳双方都能接受。通过以上分析,提出防止个人所得税偷漏的治理对策。
In this paper, the construction of levy game model to analyze the country and the taxpayers in the personal income tax levying game strategy choice. In the design and actual collection and management of the personal income tax system, the government should consider the government’s policy choice and the taxpayer’s response and behavior choice. Taxpayers will weigh the benefits they can get and the possible penalties when they conduct the tax evasion , The outcome of the game between the two sides will eventually reach a balance, making the admission of both sides can accept. Through the above analysis, put forward to prevent personal income tax stolen management countermeasures.