目前国内对于武器装备采办中的委托代理关系和信息不对称问题的研究尚处于起步阶段,且大多是定性分析与描述,定量化、模型化的应用与研究鲜见。本文对武器装备采办中存在的信息不对称现象进行解析,对其中典型的道德风险问题进行博弈规制设计,以期为装备采办中的承包商激励与约 At present, the research on the principal-agent relationship and information asymmetry in the procurement of weapons and equipment is still in its infancy, and most of them are qualitative analysis and description. The application and research of quantitative and modeling are rare. This article analyzes the asymmetric information existing in the procurement of weapons and equipment, and regulates the typical moral hazard among them, in order to encourage contractors to purchase equipment