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在大规模建设施工过程中,施工安全是工程项目得以有效进行的前提,安全管理应引起高度重视。采集施工损失的数据,分析了安全事故的变化趋势,进而通过收益矩阵建立了施工安全的复制动态方程模型,探讨局中人进行施工安全管理的必要性,并根据局中人的进化稳定策略做盈亏平衡分析。结果表明,在追求利益最大化的前提下,局中人会以最小损失的方式选择博弈策略。以复制动态方程为例,当x*i≤0时,函数F(xi)在[0,1]上的进化稳定策略为x*i=1,得到安全管理成本Ci≤Ri+P1(1-P2)Yi,表明较低的成本会使所有局中人都愿意进行安全管理。最后,从算例可知,当x*i分别在区间[-∞,0]、[0,1]、[1,+∞]上取值时,局中人的策略也会随之变化。
In the process of large-scale construction and construction, construction safety is the prerequisite for the effective implementation of the project. Safety management should be given high priority. Collect the data of construction loss, analyze the changing trend of safety accidents, and then establish the replica dynamic equation model of construction safety through the revenue matrix, and discuss the necessity of safety management of construction workers in the construction bureau. Break-even analysis. The results show that under the premise of maximizing the interests, the gamers will choose the game strategy with the least loss. Taking the dynamic equation replication as an example, when x * i≤0, the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the function F (xi) on [0,1] is x * i = 1 and the security management cost Ci≤Ri + P1 (1- P2) Yi, indicating that lower costs would make all bureaucracies willing to conduct safety management. Finally, from the example we can see that when x * i is in the interval [-∞, 0], [0,1], [1, + ∞] respectively, the strategies of the players will change accordingly.