研究了互补性物品的最优拍卖机制.基于Myerson的单物品拍卖设计思想,建立了对互补性拍卖品的机制设计模型,求解出了两类物品情形下的最优拍卖机制,并通过算例说明了此机制在实际中的运用.进一步地,将此最优机制与几种常见的拍卖机制进行比较,结果表明,对于互补性物品的拍卖,卖主采用此机制获得的期望收益最高,并且对物品的配置最有效. Based on Myerson’s design idea of ​​single item auction, a mechanism design model for complementary auction items is established, and the optimal auction mechanism for two types of items is solved. Finally, This mechanism is used in practice.Furthermore, comparing this optimal mechanism with several common auction mechanisms, the results show that for the auctions of complementary items, the seller has the highest expected return using this mechanism, The most effective allocation of items.