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绝密情报不被利用造成失败1932年初,随着第三次反“围剿”的胜利,红军缴获了大量敌人的装备,包括多部无线电台。为此,中革军委决定将总参谋部执行侦听任务的侦察台从通信部门中分离出来,成立军委二局,专门执行无线电侦察任务。二局成立后,在局长曾希圣的领导下,侦听能力迅速提高,多次破译国民党军队的多种版本的密电码,为红军反“围剿”提供了可靠情报。在长征前,二局基本上已经具备了破译国民党军队各类密电的能力,成为中共中央、中革军委的秘密武器。
In the early 1932, with the victory of the third “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the Red Army seized a large number of enemy equipment, including a number of radio stations. To this end, the Central Military Commission decided to reconnaissance task of the General Staff of the reconnaissance platform separated from the communications sector, the establishment of the CMC two special radio radio reconnaissance mission. After the establishment of the Second Bureau, under the leadership of Zeng Xi-san, the Secretary-General has rapidly raised its listening ability and has repeatedly cracked down many versions of the KMT’s secret code so as to provide credible intelligence for the Red Army’s “encirclement and suppression campaign.” Before the Long March, the two Councils basically had the ability to crack down on various types of dense electricity of the KMT army and became the secret weapon of the CPC Central Committee and the Chinese Revolutionary Army.