本文梳理重要概念及其独创的见解和应用。对机制的新理解和激励相容概念使得机制设计框架得以确立;显示原理及其拓展简化分析框架。公共品经济难以有效权衡配置效率、自愿参与和激励相容。在拟线性和一般经济环境下,公共品提供的占优策略均衡机制分别存在严格的帕累托无效或独裁。在贝叶斯环境下,公共品经济和私人品经济的帕累托效率与自愿参与可能难以兼容。对于公共品不兼容性在极限角度仍成立。纳什执行及其拓展试图使在所设机制下的所有均衡结果对于社会选择目标都最优。最优简要梳理在拍卖和规制两项应用领域的发展。尽管对称独立下的私人价值拍卖模型拓展及其理解研究成果丰硕,但是有些拓展的结论仍不明朗。最优规制机制分析及其拓展变革传统规制理论,促进规制机制评价和效应分析等方面的发展。 This article teaches important concepts and their original ideas and applications. The new understanding of mechanisms and the concept of Incentive Compatibility allowed the establishment of a mechanism design framework; the display of principles and their expansion simplified the analytical framework. Public goods economy is difficult to effectively balance the allocation efficiency, voluntary participation and incentive compatibility. In the quasi-linear and general economic environment, there are strict Pareto invalidations or dictatorships in the equilibrium of the dominant strategies provided by public goods respectively. In the Bayesian context, the Pareto efficiency of public and private economies may be incompatible with voluntary participation. Incompatible with public goods still holds the limit. Nash’s implementation and its expansion attempt to optimize all the equilibrium results under the established mechanism for the social selection goals. The best and simple combing in the auction and regulation of the two application areas. Although the expansion of private value auction model under symmetrical independence and its fruitful understanding of the research results, some of the conclusions of the expansion are still not clear. Analysis of optimal regulatory mechanism and its development to reform traditional regulation theory, promote the evaluation of regulatory mechanism and effect analysis.