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本文从监管者视角,研究了中国煤炭安全监管体系中“内部监管”的有效性。通过构建“关系压力”下监管者的模型,本文发现,为了有效激励安监员,一线工人的选择必须同时纳入系统考虑。进一步,通过搜集10家煤矿企业2012—12013年的安全监察数据,对“内部监管”有效性进行了实证检验。结果表明,由于激励设置的不当,工作数量即出勤天数和安监员的岗位级别对安监员收入有显著影响。而反映监管质量的不安全行为查处和处罚,对安监员的收入都没有显著性影响。“关系压力”下的安监员选择了最小监管量,导致了“内部监管”流于形式,与煤矿的安全生产水平关系不明。
This paper studies the effectiveness of “internal regulation” in China’s coal safety supervision system from the perspective of supervisors. By building a model of “regulators under” “relationship pressure”, this paper finds that in order to effectively motivate security supervisors, the choice of front-line workers must also be systematically considered. Further, by collecting the safety monitoring data of 10 coal mine enterprises from 2012 to 2013, we conducted an empirical test on the effectiveness of “internal supervision.” The results show that due to the improper setting of incentives, the number of jobs, that is, the number of attendance days and the rank of safety supervisors have a significant impact on the safety supervisors’ income. The investigation and punishment of unsafe behaviors that reflect the quality of supervision have no significant effect on the income of the safety supervisors. Under the “pressure of security” under the supervision of the minimum amount of supervision, resulting in “internal regulation ” mere formality, and mine safety level of production is unknown.