论文部分内容阅读
拉德布鲁赫法哲学及其政党学说通常被认为是一种完全的相对主义。在本文看来,他所秉持的实为一种认知上的相对主义,道德上则是绝对主义。这直接引发其理论内部巨大的紧张:相对主义的认知难以证立绝对主义道德。文章围绕这一紧张关系而展开批判,首先梳理了其法哲学及其政党学说,认为个体、超个体以及跨人格三种价值具有很强的覆盖性,但仅凭个体价值无法化解这一紧张,相反为他所忽略的跨人格价值却极具启发性。文章随后从法律商讨理论批判其政党学说,重建其跨人格价值。最后指出,拉氏的个体主义法律观若无跨人格的共同作用,便无力承担起证立政治统一而价值多元的现代法治国的任务。
Radbrukh law philosophy and its party theory are often considered as a complete relativism. In this paper, what he upholds is actually a kind of cognitive relativism and morally absolute. This directly triggers a huge internal tension in its theory: the relativism’s cognition makes it difficult to establish absolute morality. The article begins with a critique of this tension. First of all, it sorts out its jurisprudence and its theory of party politics, and holds that individual, super individual and trans-personality have strong coverage. However, the tension alone can not be resolved by individual value alone. On the contrary, he ignored the cross-personality value is very inspiring. The article then criticizes its party theory from the theory of law to reconstruct its trans-personality value. Finally, it points out that La’s personal legal concept of law can not afford to assume the task of establishing a modern law-governed country with diverse political values without any cross-personality effect.