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以营销渠道行为与组织理论为基础,实证探讨了企业间关系质量对制造商使用关系型治理与经销商投机行为之间关系的调节影响。通过对来自制造业的152份数据分析发现:在低企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会抑制经销商的投机行为,采用共同解决问题的方式则会增多经销商的投机行为;在高企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会增多经销商的投机行为,而采用共同解决问题的方式则会抑制经销商的投机行为。本文的研究结论对于制造商合理选择关系型治理方式制定决策,抑制经销商的投机行为具有重要的理论与实践意义。
Based on the theory of marketing channel and organization, this paper empirically explores the influence of the quality of the relationship between enterprises on the adjustment of the relationship between the manufacturer¡¯s use of relational governance and the speculation of dealers. Through the analysis of 152 data from the manufacturing industry, found that in the low quality of inter-firm relationship, manufacturers use the common way of planning for the relationship-based management will inhibit the speculation of dealers, the use of joint solutions to the problem will increase the distribution Under the high quality of inter-firm relationship, the manufacturer’s cooperative governance through common planning will increase the speculation of dealers, while adopting the joint solution to the problem will restrain the speculation of dealers. The conclusion of this paper has important theoretical and practical significance for manufacturers to make decisions rationally on the relationship-based governance and to suppress speculation on the part of dealers.