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在市场需求是一种依赖于销售价格的线性结构下,建立由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级双渠道供应链模型.在改进收入共享契约下,分别针对零售商不利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶两种情形,探讨公平偏好对双渠道供应链最优定价策略及契约协调性的影响.研究表明,最优零售价格随零售商不利不公平厌恶偏好增大而减小,随其有利不公平厌恶偏好增大而增大;最优直销价格不受零售商公平偏好影响,制造商始终完全占有直销渠道的销售收入;最优批发价格大小与零售商收入共享比例和公平偏好程度有关;改进收入共享契约仅在零售商不利不公平厌恶偏好下能够实现双渠道供应链协调.
Under the linear structure that the market demand is dependent on the sales price, a two-stage two-channel supply chain model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer is established. Under the contract of improving revenue sharing, the two models are respectively unfavorable and unfair aversion for retailers and Unfair aversion and unfair aversion, and discusses the impact of fair preference on the optimal pricing strategy and contractual coordination of dual-channel supply chain.The results show that the optimal retail price decreases with the preference of retailers unfair dislike, The preference of unfair dislike increases and increases; the optimal direct selling price is not affected by the retailer’s fair preference, and the manufacturer always retains the sales revenue of the direct sales channel; the optimal wholesale price is related to retailer’s share of income and fairness preference ; Improving revenue-sharing contracts enables dual-channel supply chain coordination only for retailer unfavorable unfair aversion preferences.